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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by §78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A. This is an 
appeal from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, dated and entered August 18, 1995. Notice of Appeal was filed September 15. 
1995. This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court on 
November 7, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POINT I. LOTTS ARE USING THE ONLY REMAINING ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO REARGUE THE MERITS OF THE CASE. ALL ISSUES ON THE 
MERITS ARE MOOT AND HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FROM THIS 
APPEAL. 
Standard of Review. Since this issue arises from the dismissal of the appeal on 
the merits by this Court, there is no standard of review other than correctness. 
POINT II. TIME WAS NOT THE ESSENCE OF THE AGREEMENT UNTIL AFTER 
MAY 16, 1994, AND WAS NOT THEREAFTER BECAUSE ALL DELAYS 
WERE CAUSED BY THE LOTTS. 
Standard of Review. Review of a summary judgment is based on correctness. 
Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co.. 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995). 
POINT III. THE MATERIAL FACTS IN THIS MATTER WERE NOT IN DISPUTE 
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE. 
Standard of Review. Review of a summary judgment is based on correctness. 
Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co.. 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995). 
iii 
POINT IV. ALL DELAYS IN CLOSING ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO LOTTS AND NOT 
TO KNIGHTON. THEIR EXCUSES FOR NOT CLOSING ARE ALL 
SPURIOUS. 
Standard of Review. Review of a summary judgment is based on correctness. 
Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co. 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995). 
POINT V. KNIGHTON IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON THIS 
APPEAL AND THE MERGER DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION HERE. 
Standard of Review. Since this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, there 
is no standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in 
a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these 
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single 
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or 
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain 
time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own 
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion 
for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a part's 
response to a motion or other paper. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS A. LOTT and 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 950760-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the sale of Lot 113, 
Hi-Country Estates, Phase II, Subdivision (hereinafter the "property"), from plaintiffs 
(hereinafter the "Lotts") to Kerry L. Knighton (hereinafter "Knighton"). The agreement 
provided for the conveyance of the property to Knighton and payment by him of $3,500.00 
down payment and the balance of $31,500.00 on a promissory note secured by a trust deed 
against the property. Lotts claimed a breach of the agreement by Knighton for not closing 
by May 1, 1994, while Knighton actually closed his side of the transaction on April 29, 1994, 
and, because the Lotts failed to close their side, he sought specific performance of the 
agreement by Lotts. 
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Course of Proceedings 
Complaints were filed by Lotts on July 27, 1994, and by Knighton on July 28, 
1994. In addition to their claim to terminate the agreement and for forfeiture of the earnest 
money, the Lotts asserted that the filing of a Notice of Interest against the property 
constituted a wrongful lien and joined Knighton's attorney as a defendant because he signed 
the notice as attorney for Knighton. The two cases were consolidated and Knighton filed 
a motion for summary judgment. At the hearing on this motion, Lotts requested a 
continuance to allow them to file a cross-motion for summary judgment. Lotts then filed a 
motion for summary judgment. Each motion asserted the material facts were not in dispute. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
The summary judgment motions were heard by the lower court on June 22, 
1995. The court granted Knighton's motion and denied Lotts' motion and signed an order 
to that effect on August 18, 1995. That order required the delivery of the deed to the 
property by Lotts to Knighton within thirty days or the court would enter an order vesting 
title pursuant to Rule 70, U.R.C.P. The order further awarded attorney's fees to Knighton 
in the amount of $8845.00 and provided that those fees could be offset against the payments 
due Lotts unless Lotts filed a supersedeas bond for the amount of 'he fees and costs 
awarded. 
Course of Proceedings on Appeal 
Instead of seeking a stay and filing a supersedeas bond, Lotts' attorney 
delivered the deed to Knighton's attorney on September 14, 1995, and filed a Notice of 
Appeal and Cost Bond on Appeal on September 15, 1995. On September 19, 1995, 
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Knighton's attorney sent a check to Lotts' attorney for the amount of the payments due 
Lotts and assessments paid by Lotts, less the fees awarded, as provided in the court's order. 
The deed and the trust deed back to the Lotts to secure the balance due were sent for 
recording. Upon receiving that check, Lotts' attorney filed a supersedeas bond for the 
$8,845.00 attorney's fees only, returned to Knighton's attorney the check for the payments 
due and the assessments and threatened foreclosure of the trust deed if the amount of the 
attorney's fees and interest on the payments and assessments were not paid in addition to 
the amounts already tendered to them. Because the deduction for attorney's fees was in 
accordance with the court's order and because no interest was due or had been ordered to 
be paid by the court, Knighton did not pay the additional amounts demanded. He did pay 
to Lotts the accruing installments due under the note. Lotts' attorney, nevertheless, 
recorded a notice of default, demanding interest, assessments and attorney's fees which were 
not due. Rather than to get involved in a further dispute as to the amount due, Knighton 
paid the full amount demanded to Lotts' attorney on January 4, 1996. On January 18, 1996. 
Lotts demanded an additional $6,081.35 from Knighton to pay interest accrued before 
judgment and before delivery of the deed, additional assessments and attorney's fees. 
Knighton paid that sum under protest on January 22, 1996. Lotts accepted those funds and 
caused a deed of reconveyance to be recorded on January 23, 1996. Knighton thereupon 
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness and a request for attorney's fees on 
appeal. That motion was granted by this Court and this case was dismissed on the merits 
on April 16, 1996, leaving only the question of the awarding of attorney's fees to be 
considered. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Knighton is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and defendant 
Ralph J. Marsh is his attorney. [R. 1, 1f1f 2-3]. 
2. Lotts are residents of Pennsylvania [R. 1, HI] but the real property involved 
in this action is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah [R. 2, 116] and the agreement 
between the parties was entered into and was to be performed in the State of Utah. 
[Admitted in 112 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
3. On January 29, 1994, Knighton presented to Lotts a written offer to 
purchase the property for $35,000.00, payable $200.00 as earnest money, $3300.00 down 
payment at closing and $31,500.00 on a promissory note secured by a trust deed against the 
property. [R. 54-57, Exhibit A in Addendum to Brief of Appellants (hereinafter "Appellants' 
Addendum")]. 
4. On February 7, 1994, Lotts accepted the offer subject to changing the 
amount of earnest money to $1,000.00 and reducing the down payment to $2,500.00. [R. 56]. 
5. This counteroffer was accepted by Knighton on February 17, 1994. [R. 56]. 
6. The agreement between the parties is an Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
which provides, among other things, as follows: 
a) The closing shall take place upon receipt of survey but no later than May 
1, 1994, at a reasonable location to be designated by Seller; [§8, Exh. A]. 
b) Seller shall provide to Buyer, not less than five business days prior to 
closing, a preliminary title report on the subject property; [§§G and V, Exh. A]. 
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c) Seller shall convey title to Buyer by warranty deed free of defects; [§S, Exh. 
A]. 
c) Seller shall furnish good and marketable title to the property evidenced by 
a current policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price 
containing no exceptions other than those provided for in the standard form 
policy; [§§3 and H, Exh. A]. 
d) The agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and 
supersedes and cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations, 
warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties, there are no oral 
agreements which modify or affect the agreement and the agreement cannot 
be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties; [§L, Exh. A]. 
e) Should either party default, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing the agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided by the agreement 
or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or 
otherwise. [§N, Exh. A]. 
7. Lotts failed to designate a location for the closing of the sale. [R. 39, 
Knighton Affidavit, H6]. 
8. Lotts failed to provide to Knighton a preliminary title report within five days 
prior to May 1, 1994, or at any time since. [R. 39, Knighton Affidavit, H6]. 
9. Knighton, therefore, contacted Lotts by telephone and obtained their 
permission, on the evening of April 26, 1994, to have his attorney obtain a preliminary title 
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report and prepare the necessary closing papers. [R. 39, Knighton Affidavit, 117; R. 129-30, 
MI 7-9]. 
10. A preliminary title report was ordered on April 27, 1994, but not received 
until Monday, May 2, 1994. [R. 39, Knighton Affidavit, 118]. 
11. Knighton deposited the down payment with his attorney and signed a 
promissory note, trust deed and closing statement and left those with his attorney on Friday, 
April 29, 1994. Copies of those documents are attached to Exhibit C in Appellants' 
Addendum. [R. 39, Knighton Affidavit, 119, R. 60-62]. 
12. On Friday, April 29, 1994, a closing statement and warranty deed were 
prepared and sent to Lotts by Knighton's attorney with a cover letter requesting Lotts to sign 
and return those documents and to call if they had any questions. Copies of those 
documents are attached to Exhibit C in Appellants' Addendum. [R. 64-66]. These 
documents were received by Lotts on May 3, 1994. [Admitted in 1111 of plaintiffs' complaint, 
R. 3]. 
13. On May 3, 1994, the title report was received by Knighton's attorney. It 
showed title to the property to be in Zions First National Bank, with other exceptions to the 
title. [R. 262-8, Attachment to Exhibit G in Appellants' Addendum]. Lotts were, therefore, 
not in a position to convey good title to Knighton. 
14. On May 3, 1994, Dennis Lott called Knighton to request that a copy of the 
note and trust deed be sent to them and that charges for owner's assessments and a closing 
fee be deleted from the closing statement. [Admitted in 1113 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
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15. On May 6, 1994, Knighton's attorney sent a revised closing statement and 
copies of the note and trust deed to Lotts with a cover letter requesting Lotts again to sign 
and return the closing statement and deed and to call if they had any questions. Copies of 
the letter and revised closing statement are attached to Exhibit C. [Admitted in U14 of 
plaintiffs' Answer and 1112 of plaintiffs' complaint, R. 3], 
16. On May 16, 1994, Dennis Lott called Knighton and informed him that Lotts 
knew that a water assessment was about to be made against the property and they did not 
want to pay that assessment and requested a change in the trust deed to provide for that. 
Knighton informed Lott that he, Knighton, would pay that assessment when it was made. 
This information was conveyed to Knighton's attorney on May 20, 1994, with a request that 
he call Lotts to discuss the matter. [R. 40, Knighton Affidavit, 1113]. 
17. Knighton's attorney was able to reach Lotts on May 24, 1994, when they 
requested him to prepare a new trust deed providing that Knighton pay all assessments, and 
specifically water assessments, after May 1, 1994, to have it signed by Knighton and then to 
call them by telephone so that they could turn on their fax machine and have a copy of the 
new trust deed faxed to them. [Admitted in 1116 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
18. Because Knighton was not able to come into his attorney's office 
immediately to sign the new trust deed, the new trust deed was mailed to him on May 27, 
1994. It was returned to Knighton's attorney on May 31, 1994. [R. 40, Knighton Affidavit, 
1115]. 
19. Knighton's attorney was not able to reach Lotts until June 7, 1994, when 
he was able to speak with Francine Lott. She informed him that she did not know how to 
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turn the fax machine on and would have to wait until her husband was available. She was 
requested to have her husband, Dennis Lott, call when he was available. [The telephone call 
is admitted in 1118 of plaintiffs' Answer but the substance of the conversation is denied]. 
20. In the evening of June 7, Dennis Lott called Knighton and told him they 
wanted to terminate the agreement. [R. 40, Knighton Affidavit, 1116]. 
21. On June 9, 1994, Knighton's attorney sent to Lotts a copy of the new trust 
deed revised as requested by Lotts with a cover letter requesting that they sign and return 
the closing statement and deed. Copies of that letter and trust deed are attached to Exhibit 
C in Appellants' Addendum. [Admitted in 1120 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
22. On June 16, 1994, Lotts caused their attorney to send a letter to Knighton's 
attorney informing him that the agreement had been terminated. [Admitted in 1121 of 
plaintiffs'Answer]. 
23. By further letters of June 21, 1994, and July 8, 1994, and telephone 
discussions, the parties were not been able to resolve the matter. [Admitted in 1122 of 
plaintiffs'Answer]. 
24. Lotts filed their complaint asking for termination of the agreement and 
forfeiture to them of the earnest money on July 27, 1994, and Knighton filed his complaint 
for specific performance of the agreement on July 28, 1994. The cases were consolidated 
on November 23, 1994. [R. 34]. 
25. Knighton filed a motion for summary judgment on November 30, 1994. [R. 
36]. A hearing was held on this motion on February 16, 1995. [R. 212]. At the request of 
Lotts, the hearing was continued without date to allow Lotts to file a cross-motion for 
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summary judgment. When they failed to file a motion, Knighton had his motion for 
summary judgment set for hearing again on June 9, 1995. [R. 216]. Lotts then filed their 
motion for summary judgment on June 8, 1995, and asked the court to continue the hearing 
until June 22, 1995. [R. 281]. After argument on the motions, the court granted Knighton's 
motion for summary judgment and denied Lotts' motion for summary judgment. After a 
hearing on objections to the proposed order and on Knighton's request for attorney's fees, 
an order was signed on August 18, 1995, entering judgment of specific performance in favor 
of Knighton, ordering Lotts to deliver a warranty deed within thirty days or be subject to an 
order vesting title pursuant to Rule 70, U.R.C.P. and awarding Knighton attorney's fees in 
the amount of $8,845.00. The order provided that the attorney's fees could be offset against 
payments due under the note unless a supersedeas bond was filed in the amount of the 
attorney's fees awarded. [R. 323, Exh. J in Appellants' Addendum]. 
26. The deed was delivered to Knighton's attorney on September 14, 1995, 
along with a letter demanding payment of installments accrued under the note since June 
1, 1994, with interest thereon, and assessments paid by the Lotts, with interest thereon. 
[Exh. S in Appellee's Addendum]. 
27. On September 15, 1995, Lotts filed a Notice of Appeal [Exh. K in 
Appellants' Addendum] and $300.00 Cost Bond on Appeal [Exh. R] but no stay of the 
judgment was obtained and no supersedeas bond was filed. 
28. On September 19, 1995, the warranty deed and trust deed were sent for 
recording and the promissory note and copy of the trust deed were delivered to Lotts' 
attorney, along with a letter and trust check for all payments due under the note up through 
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September 1, 1995, and assessments against the property paid by Lotts, totaling $14,406.68, 
less the attorney's fees awarded by the court. [Exh. T, Exh. W, 114, in Appellees' 
Addendum]. 
29. That tender of payment was rejected by Lotts on September 20, 1995. 
[Exh. W, 11 5, in Appellees' Addendum]. Also on that date, the Lotts belatedly filed a 
supersedeas bond for only the amount of attorney's fees awarded. [Exh. M in Appellants' 
Addendum]. 
30. The monthly installment due under the note was sent by Knighton to Lotts 
on October 10, 1995, and retained by them. [Exh. W, 11 6, in Appellees' Addendum]. 
31. On October 23, 1995, Lotts caused the trustee under the trust deed to 
record with the Salt Lake County Recorder and serve upon Knighton a Notice of Default 
claiming a default by Knighton under the promissory note and trust deed, accelerating the 
balance due and electing to sell the property at trustee's sale. [Exh W, K 7, in Appellees' 
Addendum]. 
32. On January 4, 1996, Knighton paid to Lotts' trustee the sum of $38,734.54 
to pay the entire balance of the note, plus interest, assessments and the down payment. 
[Exh. W, 11 8, in Appellees' Addendum]. 
33. On January 18, 1996, by letter from Lotts' attorney to Knighton's attorney, 
Lotts demanded an additional $6,081.35 from Knighton to pay interest accrued before the 
judgment and before the deed was delivered, additional assessments and attorney's fees 
incurred even though there was no default. [Exh. W, 11 9, in Appellees' Addendum; Letter 
attached to Exh. X in Appellees' Addendum]. 
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34. On January 22, 1996, Knighton paid to Lotts the additional $6,081.35 
demanded by Lotts. This amount was paid under protest to put an end to Lotts' claims for 
further interest, fees, etc. [Exh. W, 11 10, in Appellees' Addendum; Letter attached to Exh. 
X in Appellees' Addendum]. 
35. On January 23, 1996, Lotts caused a deed of reconveyance to be delivered 
to Knighton, which was recorded January 24, 1996, thereby releasing any security interest 
in the property. [Exh. W, 11 11, in Appellees' Addendum]. 
36. Knighton filed a Suggestion of Mootness and Motion to Dismiss Appeal 
for Mootness and Request for Attorney's Fees on February 16, 1996 [Exh. U in Appellees' 
Addendum], with supporting Memorandum [Exh. V in Appellees' Addendum] and Affidavit 
[Exh. W in Appellees' Addendum]. 
37. This motion to dismiss was granted by this Court on April 17, 1996, 
dismissing this case on the merits and reserving only the question of attorney's fees. [Exh. 
O in Appellants' Addendum]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. LOTTS ARE USING THE ONLY REMAINING ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO REARGUE THE MERITS OF THE CASE. ALL ISSUES ON THE 
MERITS ARE MOOT AND HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FROM THIS 
APPEAL. 
Since Knighton prevailed on the merits of this case, he is entitled to the 
attorney's fees awarded to him below pursuant to the agreement between the parties. The 
merits of the case have been rendered moot by the actions of Lotts in acquiescing in the 
judgment and are now beyond the scope of this appeal. The only issue remaining is the 
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reasonableness of the fees awarded below and Lotts have not challenged the reasonableness 
of those fees. They have attempted to challenge the recoverability of those fees by 
rearguing the merits of the case. Since those issues are moot, this Court is precluded from 
examining them. The award of attorney's fees following the decision of the lower court in 
Knighton's favor is a matter of legal right. The acquiescence in the judgment on the merits 
is an acquiescence in the awarding of fees which follows as a legal right from the judgment. 
POINT II. TIME WAS NOT THE ESSENCE OF THE AGREEMENT UNTIL AFTER 
MAY 16, 1994, AND WAS NOT THEREAFTER BECAUSE ALL DELAYS 
WERE CAUSED BY THE LOTTS. 
The plain wording of the agreement states that time is of the essence only after 
fifteen days following the scheduled closing date and the Utah Supreme Court has so 
interpreted this very clause. Time was also not the essence of the agreement after that date 
because the Lotts' requests for changes in the closing documents constituted requests for 
extensions of time to close to which Knighton agreed. Lotts could not thereafter legally 
declare any default until they had scheduled a new closing date and had tendered their own 
performance. Because Knighton had already totally performed his side of the agreement 
on April 29, 1994, and Lotts never performed, Knighton was entitled to a decree of specific 
performance. In failing to cooperate in getting the transaction closed, Lotts also breached 
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in all agreements. 
POINT III. THE MATERIAL FACTS IN THIS MATTER WERE NOT IN DISPUTE 
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE. 
The Lotts have continued to assert that some facts are in dispute in order to 
attack the lower court's decision. That decision on the merits is moot and whether some 
facts are in dispute is now irrelevant. However, while some non-material facts may have 
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been in dispute, there was no genuine dispute as to any material facts. Those undisputed 
material facts were that Knighton closed on April 29, 1994, and Lotts never did perform. 
Summary judgment decreeing specific performance was proper. 
POINT IV. ALL DELAYS IN CLOSING ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO LOTTS AND NOT 
TO KNIGHTON. THEIR EXCUSES FOR NOT CLOSING ARE ALL 
SPURIOUS. 
The closing was delayed only because Lotts requested changes in the closing 
documents. Those requests were all accommodated. The Lotts' excuses for not closing are 
all spurious. They claim Knighton's delivery of documents to his attorney was not 
performance yet they admit that they had agreed that his attorney would be the closing 
agent. They claim the closing was contingent upon Knighton obtaining a survey when they 
admit the survey was solely for Knighton's benefit. They claim the language in the revised 
trust deed caused them not to close when they admit not having seen the revised trust deed 
until after they had refused to close. They claim their payment of the water assessment 
changed their basis in the property and justified termination of the agreement when in fact 
they had not paid the water assessment and they knew all along that Knighton had agreed 
to pay the assessment. They claim that Knighton suddenly became a credit risk when 
Knighton's credit was never a condition of the agreement. They claim that Knighton's 
failure to pay the June 1, 1994, installment under the promissory note justified their 
cancellation of the agreement when it should be obvious that Knighton had no obligation 
under that note until they had delivered the deed and closed the transaction. Most of these 
claims were not asserted until one year after they refused to close and all of these claims, 
and numerous others, are false, fraudulent and frivolous. 
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POINT V, KNIGHTON IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON THIS 
APPEAL AND THE MERGER DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION HERE, 
The merger doctrine does not apply to the defense of an appeal from a 
judgment properly entered below. This appeal is simply an extension of the case which 
awarded Knighton a decree of specific performance. The Supreme Court and this Court 
have held that a party who is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the agreement in dispute 
is also entitled to the fees incurred on an appeal as a matter of legal right. Furthermore, 
because the claims made by the Lotts throughout this case and on this appeal are spurious 
and without foundation in law or fact, this appeal is frivolous and has been brought only for 




LOTTS ARE USING THE ONLY REMAINING ISSUE OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO REARGUE THE MERITS OF THE 
CASE- ALL ISSUES ON THE MERITS ARE MOOT AND 
HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FROM THIS APPEAL. 
After determining that Lotts had not ever tendered their performance of the 
agreement and that Knighton was entitled to have the agreement specifically performed, the 
lower court awarded Knighton his attorney's fees in accordance with the agreement which 
provided that the defaulting party "shall" pay all fees and costs incurred in enforcing the 
agreement. [R. 58, §N]. That award of fees to Knighton is, of course, based on the fact that 
Knighton prevailed on the merits of the case. Lotts appealed from the lower court's 
decision on the merits but failed to obtain a stay of the judgment or to file a supersedeas 
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bond to prevent the judgment from being enforced. In fact, Lotts acquiesced in the 
judgment and accepted the benefits thereof by delivering the warranty deed and accepting 
the promissory note and trust deed for the balance due. They went further by demanding 
payment under the promissory note (of amounts that were not even due yet) and 
commencing foreclosure proceedings against Knighton to force payment of these amounts. 
Knighton paid the promissory note in full along with all interest and fees that were 
demanded by Lotts. Lotts accepted those funds and reconveyed the trust deed, thus 
releasing all security they held in the property. This Court, therefore, quite properly 
dismissed Lotts' appeal on the merits for mootness. That precludes any further inquiry into 
the merits of the case. 
Since Knighton prevailed on the merits and the merits are now beyond inquiry, 
Knighton is entitled to the attorney's fees awarded in obtaining the decision in his favor on 
the merits. The language of the agreement is mandatory: "the defaulting party shall pay all 
costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or 
by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise." [R. 58, §N]. 
Under this scenario, the only question which might remain is the reasonableness of the fees 
awarded. Lotts have not challenged the reasonableness of the fees but only the 
"recoverability of attorneys' fees." [Brief of Appellants, p. 17]. It has been established by 
the Utah Supreme Court that "attorneys fees, when awarded as allowed by law, are awarded 
as a matter of legal right." Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). In reliance 
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on that case, this Court has held, in Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 
1989): 
[C]ontrary to [the] contention that attorneys fees should be 
determined on the basis of an equitable standard, attorneys fees, 
when awarded as allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of legal 
right." Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). "Since 
the right is contractual, the court does not possess the same 
equitable discretion to deny attorney's fees that it has when 
fashioning equitable remedies, or applying a statute which allows 
the discretionary award of such fees." Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 
507 F.2d 216, 226 (5th Cir. 1975). 
Since the contract between the parties provides that fees shall be awarded, this Court does 
not have the discretion to deny those fees. They are a matter of legal right. 
Lotts have argued that the fees are recoverable only "if the Lotts did in fact 
breach the Earnest Money Sales Agreement" and then they launch into an attack upon the 
lower court's decision on the merits of the case, that is, on the time of the essence clause 
and alleged delays in the closing. Whether the lower court was right or wrong on these 
issues, they are now moot. It would be a ludicrous situation for this Court to determine that 
the lower court was in error on these issues when these issues have already been rendered 
moot and the decision on the merits of these issues cannot be reversed. If they are moot, 
they are beyond the scope of this appeal and may not be rehashed. The merits of the case 
being moot, so also is the recoverability of fees awarded in pursuing the merits, except as 
to the reasonableness of those fees which has not been challenged. It is interesting that the 
Cabrera case involved a situation that is comparable to the one now before the Court. In 
that case, a challenge was made to attorney's fees awarded to the defendants after the case 
had been dismissed with prejudice on motion of the plaintiffs. The court held that the 
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defendants were the prevailing parties and were entitled to attorney's fees even though the 
case had not been decided on its merits. In this case, the dismissal of the case on the merits 
for mootness precludes this Court from proceeding to determine the case on its merits 
(although the lower court has already done so). That leaves Knighton as the prevailing party 
and he is, likewise, entitled to be awarded his attorney's fees as a matter of legal right. The 
only difference between the two cases is that the plaintiffs in Cabrera caused the dismissal 
by their motion to dismiss and Lotts in this case caused the dismissal of the appeal by their 
actions in acquiescing in the judgment and accepting the benefits thereof. That is a 
difference without a distinction. The results are the same. The merits of both cases are 
irrelevant. The award of attorney's fees here should likewise stand as a matter of legal right. 
POINT II 
TIME WAS NOT THE ESSENCE OF THE AGREEMENT 
UNTIL AFTER MAY 16, 1994, AND WAS NOT THEREAFTER 
BECAUSE ALL DELAYS WERE CAUSED BY THE LOTTS. 
Lotts have argued that all obligations to close this transaction were on Knighton 
and his attorney and their failure to close by May 1, 1994, is a breach of the agreement. It 
must first be remembered that the agreement itself placed the burden on Lotts to provide 
to Knighton a preliminary title report five business days in advance of the closing and to 
designate a reasonable location for the closing. They did neither and have attempted to foist 
these obligations on Knighton as an excuse for their own failure. These matters are really 
irrelevant because time was not the essence of this agreement until after May 16, 1994, and 
was not of the essence thereafter because Lotts' requests for changes in the documents 
amounted to an agreement to extend the closing date. 
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First, looking at the language of the time of the essence clause of the 
agreement, in section Q thereof, it clearly provides that "thereafter [that is, after fifteen days 
from the scheduled closing date], time is of the essence." Obviously, this language does not 
make time of the essence prior to that date. The preceding language referring to extensions 
due to interruption of transport, strikes, etc. does not make time of the essence as of May 
1, 1994. Rather, it provides for extensions of up to fifteen days. Then, and then only, does 
the contract make time of the essence. The recent Utah case of Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 
352, 354 (Utah 1991), interpreted this same time of the essence clause in the Utah standard 
form Earnest Money Sales Agreement to mean that the clause had no effect until after the 
expiration of the stated fifteen days. [In that case the agreement stated that time would be 
of the essence after thirty days]. That case disposes of all of the Lotts' arguments as to the 
meaning of the time of the essence clause. 
According to the agreement, the closing was to take place by May 1, 1994, 
which turned out to be a Sunday. Since Sunday is a legal holiday, §63-13-2(l)(a)(i), U.C.A., 
the closing could still take place on Monday, May 2, 1994.1 However, if time is not the 
essence of the agreement, the closing could take place within a reasonable time after May 
2, 1994.2 The agreement between the parties in this case did not make time the essence 
1 
Section 68-3-8, U.C.A., provides that "whenever any act of a secular nature . . . is appointed 
by law or contract to be performed upon a particular day, which day falls upon a holiday, 
such act may be performed upon the next succeeding business day with the same effect as 
if it had been performed upon the day appointed." 
2 
Century 21 All Western Real Estate and Investment Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982), 
states that "where the executory contract contains no declaration that time is of the essence, 
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of the agreement until fifteen days after the May 1 closing date. The undisputed facts show 
that Lotts failed to provide a preliminary title report or to designate a place for closing. 
Upon their failure to do so, Knighton called Lotts on April 26, 1994, and obtained their 
permission to have his attorney obtain a title report and to prepare the necessary closing 
papers. The title report was ordered but was not delivered until May 2, 1994. Nevertheless, 
Knighton's attorney prepared the closing papers, Knighton signed a promissory note, trust 
deed and closing statement and left those with his attorney on Friday April 29, 1994, and a 
closing statement and warranty deed [Exh. ME" and "F" to Exh. C in Appellants' Addendum] 
were sent to Lotts that same day with a cover letter [Exh. "F-l" to Exh. C] requesting Lotts 
to sign and return those documents and to call if they had any questions. The Lotts received 
those documents by May 3 and, instead of calling Knighton's attorney, called Knighton to 
request a copy of the note and trust deed and a new closing statement deleting charges for 
owner's assessments and closing fees. On May 6, a revised closing statement [Exh. "H" to 
Exh. C] and copies of the note and trust deed [Exh. "C and "DM to Exh. C] were sent to 
Lotts with a cover letter [Exh. "G" to Exh. C] again requesting Lotts to sign and return the 
closing statement and deed and to call if they had any questions. 
Thus, even though the obligation was on the Lotts to initiate the closing and to 
obtain and deliver a title report to Knighton and they defaulted in this obligation, at the 
request of the Lotts, Knighton proceeded to obtain a title report and to close the sale. He 
deposited the money he was to pay at the closing and signed all the documents on his side 
and left them with his attorney on April 29, 1994, in advance of the closing date set in the 
the contract obligations can continue for some time beyond the agreed closing date." 
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agreement. The documents which the Lotts were to sign were sent to them also on April 
29, 1994. The Lotts' requests for changes were accommodated and all documents sent to 
them by May 6, 1994, well within the fifteen days before time became the essence of the 
agreement. Keep in mind, that it was the Lotts who delayed the closing by failing to 
schedule the closing and provide the title report. Despite that, they could have signed and 
returned the documents well before fifteen days after the closing date. Instead, they waited 
until May 16, 1994, to call Knighton to request a further change in the documents-this time 
a change in the trust deed to provide that Knighton would pay all assessments against the 
property because they knew that a water assessment was about to be made against the 
property. Had they signed and returned the documents immediately, this water assessment 
would have been Knighton's obligation, since the deed would have been recorded making 
Knighton the owner responsible to pay all assessments and since the trust deed expressly 
obligated Knighton to pay all assessments. The expected water assessment, therefore, would 
not have been a problem. 
Nevertheless, Lotts requested a change in the trust deed providing that 
Knighton would pay all assessments, and specifically water assessments, after May 1, 1994, 
and requested that the revised trust deed be signed by Knighton and faxed to them for their 
review. Their instructions were followed but before a copy of the revised trust deed could 
be faxed to them, they decided they wanted to terminate the agreement. Their excuse for 
doing so was that the expected water assessment had been made against the property, which 
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they paid.3 This obviously occurred sometime after May 24, 1994. [HU16 and 17, plaintiffs' 
complaint, R. 4]. This excuse makes no sense for several reasons. First, had they returned 
the papers when they received them, the assessment would have been Knighton's obligation 
as the new owner of the property. Secondly, the revised trust deed made Knighton 
responsible for all assessments, and specifically water assessments, made after May 1, 1994. 
[See Exh. "J" to Exh. C]. Lotts should have signed and returned the papers, along with a 
copy of the water assessment with instructions for Knighton to pay that assessment. Thirdly, 
why didn't Lotts call to say that they had received the water assessment and to ask that 
Knighton be required to pay that as a part of the closing? Fourthly, why didn't Lotts call 
or otherwise give notice to Knighton of their intent to terminate the agreement if the closing 
were not completed by a certain date? Instead they waited until they heard from Knighton's 
attorney, with a request to turn on their fax machine so he could fax the revised trust deed, 
before they told Knighton that they wanted to terminate the agreement. The Lotts' excuse 
for wanting to get out of this agreement simply does not hold any water. They obviously had 
other reasons of their own for wanting to terminate the agreement. 
The Krantz v. Holt case further held that the time of the essence clause did not 
apply when "the delay in closing was the result of mutual agreement." The failure of the 
Lotts to tender their own performance by May 1, 1994, and their continual requests for 
further information and for changes in the documents, even if such requests were 
reasonable, constituted requests on their part for delays in the completion of the closing. 
3 
It is not true that Lotts had paid this assessment. This is discussed in Point IV below. 
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Their requests for delays were granted by Knighton as each change was accommodated. As 
stated in Krantz v. Holt, [at 354] "under those circumstances, [Lotts] would have waived 
[their] right to strictly enforce the closing date stated in the agreement." 
This case is also similar to Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 846 P.2d 1238 
(Utah 1992), where a closing date in a time of the essence contract was extended by mutual 
agreement and the buyer tendered his own performance by the last agreed upon date, the 
court held that the buyer could obtain specific performance against the defaulting seller and 
stated, at 1243: 
Neither party to an agreement "can be said to be in default (and 
thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for 
specific performance) until the other party has tendered his own 
performance." Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56. In other words, "a 
party must make a tender of his own agreed performance in order 
to put the other party in default." Id.; see also Fischer v. Johnson, 
525 P.2d 45, 46-7 (Utah 1974). 
The tender cannot impose on the other party a new condition 
or requirement not already imposed by the contract. . . . If the 
law were otherwise, one could use a tender to compel the other 
party to comply with new contractual terms. 
Similarly, in Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553 (Utah 1987), when one party realized that 
a title report could not be obtained by the May 1, 1980 closing date and attempted to obtain 
an extension of the closing date, the other party did not respond and then refused to 
perform. The court, in holding that the first party was entitled to specific performance of 
the agreement, stated that "a party to a contract may not obtain an advantage from the fact 
that he is unable [or unwilling] to perform." 
Thus, since only Knighton had tendered performance, he is the only one who 
could claim that the other party is in default. The Lotts had never tendered performance 
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on their side. The Utah cases are consistent with those elsewhere. For example, in Turner 
v. Gunderson, 807 P.2d 370 (Wash. App. 1991), both parties mutually agreed to extend a 
time of the essence contract to a date uncertain. The court stated: 
Turner and Ingram were entitled to participate in the 
establishment of a new date certain or, at a minimum, Gundersons 
were required to communicate a new date before unilaterally 
repudiating the contract. 
. . . . When an agreement provides time is of the essence, and 
performance has not been tendered by either party, such provision 
is for the benefit of both parties (unless the agreement expressly 
or impliedly makes the provision solely for the benefit of one of 
the parties), and requires the agreement of both parties to change 
the termination date. 
A reasonable time for performance can be implied. . . . 
A new date certain for closing had not been established by 
mutual agreement nor had Gundersons communicated a closing 
date before demanding immediate payment on January 21, 1987. 
This demand, coupled with a change in terms, constituted a 
repudiation. 
In this case, the Lotts and Knighton, by requesting and allowing changes in the documents, 
mutually agreed to an extension of time to close to a date uncertain. Neither party had 
communicated a new closing date. Neither could claim the other was in default without first 
establishing a new closing date. The Lotts had no right to suddenly refuse to perform on 
June 8, 1994, without first setting a new closing date. This is especially true since Knighton 
had fully performed and all delays were at the request and for the benefit of the Lotts. 
Knighton was, therefore, entitled to specific performance of the agreement. 
Furthermore, there is an obligation of good faith and fair dealing implicit in 
every contract in the State of Utah. St. Benedict's Development v. St. Benedict's Hospital 
811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991); Zion's Properties. Inc. v. Holt 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 
1975). In this case, that required Lotts to cooperate in closing the sale expeditiously. In 
Tanner v. Baadsgaard. 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980), it was held that a party who failed to make 
a payment due on May 1, 1977, and informed the other party of his attempts to obtain the 
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money, which other party made no complaints about the delay, and finally obtained and 
tendered the payment on February 21, 1978, was entitled to specific performance of the 
contract upon payment of the funds due. The court, in holding that the other party had 
waived strict compliance with the terms of the contract, stated, at 347: 
When parties have entered into a formal contract, such as for the 
purchase of real property, it is to be assumed that they will 
cooperate with each other in good faith for its performance, and 
one refusing to so perform, or claiming a forfeiture thereof, has 
the burden of showing justification for doing so. 
Lotts have argued that time was the essence of this agreement because it 
contains both a forfeiture clause and a time of the essence clause. They rely upon Barker 
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 1987) as authority for that proposition. That case actually 
states, in dictum, that a contract which requires a forfeiture of a deposit if a deadline is not 
met may mean that time is of the essence. It also states, in dictum, at 52, that "a closing 
date alone in a contract for the sale or exchange of land does not make time of the essence." 
Our contract does not provide for forfeiture of a deposit if a deadline is not met. Rather, 
it provides that "in the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the 
earnest money as liquidated damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller." 
[Section N, Exh. "A" to Exh. C in Appellants' Addendum]. As stated above, the Barker case 
actually held that when one party realized that a title report could not be obtained by the 
May 1, 1980 closing date and attempted to obtain an extension of the closing date and the 
other party did not respond and then refused to perform, the first party was entitled to 
specific performance of the agreement, stating, at 53, "a party to a contract may not obtain 
an advantage from the fact that he is unable to perform." That case, therefore, totally 
supports the position of Knighton that he was entitled to have Lotts specifically perform the 
contract because they did not provide a title report by May 1, 1994. 
Therefore, in this case, time was not of the essence until fifteen days after the 
scheduled closing date, in any event, and not thereafter because of the Lotts' requests for 
changes in the documents. We do not argue that only a disaster triggers the time of the 
essence clause, as claimed by Lotts. We only argue that time could not have been the 
essence of this agreement until fifteen days after the scheduled closing date, which is the way 
1A 
the Supreme Court reads this agreement. This language is not ambiguous nor was it drafted 
by Knighton or his attorney. It is the language of a standard form contract in common use 
which has already been construed by the Supreme Court. Lotts' attempt, after the fact, to 
twist this language to mean something else flies in the face of its clear, unambiguous 
meaning and the interpretation of the Utah Supreme Court. 
POINT HI 
THE MATERIAL FACTS IN THIS MATTER WERE NOT IN 
DISPUTE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE. 
The statements of facts given by the parties in this case may make it seem that 
some essential facts were in dispute thus precluding summary judgment. Again, this matter 
is irrelevant because the appeal has been dismissed as moot. However, the Lotts continue 
to assert the existence of disputed facts in order to attack the validity of the lower court's 
judgment. While the Lotts have disputed some of the facts stated by Knighton, there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact. The Lotts have admitted the signing of the written 
agreement. That agreement contains an integration clause excluding any consideration of 
oral representations made prior to the agreement or of any oral statements made to alter 
the agreement. [§ L]. Knighton filed a Motion to Strike the affidavits of the Lotts to the 
extent that they included information barred by the integration clause. [R. 156-7]. 
Therefore, any claims that the obligations placed upon the Lotts by the written agreement 
were orally shifted to Knighton and his attorney may not be considered by the Court. 
However, the attempt by the Lotts to shift the burden to designate a location for the closing 
and to provide a title report to Knighton at least five business days prior to the closing is an 
admission that the Lotts did not perform these obligations. It is undisputed that they failed 
to perform these two duties. It is also undisputed that the Lotts, on April 26, 1994, either 
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requested or gave their permission for Knighton and his attorney to obtain a title report, 
prepare the closing documents and for Mr. Marsh to act as closing agent. [R. 224-5, Exh. 
F in Appellants' Addendum, 117-9]. It is also undisputed that a title report was then ordered 
and received on May 2, 1994.4 The Lotts' alleged understanding that it only takes 24 hours 
to obtain a title report is both unrealistic and irrelevant. It is certainly not unreasonable that 
it took five days, including a weekend, at the end of a month when title companies are busy 
closing month-end transactions. 
It is also undisputed that Knighton signed the promissory note, trust deed and 
closing statement on April 29, 1994, and left those with the closing agent along with the 
$2,665.00 balance due on the down payment. This amount, together with the $1,000.00 he 
had previously deposited, totaled $3,665.00 that Knighton had deposited with the closing 
agent. [R. 162, MI 4 & 5]. He had thus tendered full performance of his duties under the 
agreement and had done everything he was obligated to do prior to the May 1, 1994, closing 
date. It is undisputed that the deed and Sellers' Closing Statement were prepared and sent 
to the Lotts on April 29, 1994, and that they received them on May 3, 1994. Completion 
of the closing was then entirely up to the Lotts, which they could do by signing and returning 
the deed and their closing statement. The cover letter sent to them requested that they 
4 
It is also undisputed that the title report showed that Lotts did not have clear title to the 
property and could not have completed the closing even if they had signed and returned all 
documents. Without informing Lotts of their title problems, Knighton's attorney proceeded 
to obtain a deed from Zions First National Bank to clear the title. This was Lotts' obligation 
but Knighton's attorney voluntarily proceeded to clear the title because he knew what was 
required from prior experience in this subdivision. This fact alone precludes Lotts from 
claiming a default by Knighton under the agreement. 
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telephone Mr. Marsh if they had any questions about the document. Because they had a 
facsimile machine, they could have called him to request that copies of the note and trust 
deed be faxed to them. Instead, they called Mr. Knighton that evening and requested that 
he ask Mr. Marsh to forward those copies by mail along with a revised closing statement 
deleting the closing fees and assessments. They made no complaint then about any failure 
to close by May 1, 1994, and did not pursue the most rapid method of obtaining the 
information they desired. 
When they received the copies of the note and trust deed and revised closing 
statement on May 9, 1994, they again made no complaint about any delay in the closing and 
did not respond for a whole week. They had again received a cover letter requesting that 
they call if they had any questions. They did not do so. After a week, they again called 
Knighton to request that a change be made in the trust deed. The Lotts confirmed this 
request with Mr. Marsh on May 24, 1994, and specifically instructed him to prepare a new 
trust deed making Knighton responsible for all water assessments after May 1, 1994, and to 
have Knighton sign the new trust deed. Again, they made no complaint about any delay. 
They just wanted the documents to specifically express the obligation of Knighton to pay the 
water assessments, which was done. It is also undisputed that the next communication took 
place on June 7, 1994. While the entire exact conversation is in dispute, there is no dispute 
that Mr. Marsh wanted to fax the revised trust deed to the Lotts for their approval and that 
the Lotts, for the first time, were suddenly unwilling to complete the transaction. No prior 
notice of this intent had been given. 
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Everything that had been done from April 29, 1994, to June 7, 1994, was to 
make changes in the documents to satisfy the Lotts. At no time did they ever sign the deed 
and tender their performance to Knighton or to the closing agent. None of the foregoing 
facts are in dispute. The only facts in dispute have to do with the content of various 
conversations which are all irrelevant to the terms of the contract between the parties and 
to the performance thereof. Despite the grandiose attempts by the Lotts to create a dispute 
as to the facts, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Summary judgment was 
appropriate. The material facts were clear and the lower court properly entered judgment 
on those facts as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court in Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. 
Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980), held that the rule that summary judgment is 
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact "does not preclude summary 
judgment simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is 
genuinely controverted." Summary judgment was upheld because no "material issue of fact 
has been raised, the resolution of which could constitute the defense of duress." 
Likewise, in this case, the Lotts have failed to raise any material issue as to 
whether Knighton completely performed the agreement on his side. It is totally undisputed 
that Knighton did everything required of him to close this transaction on April 29, 1994. 
Everything that happened thereafter was done to satisfy requests made by the Lotts and all 
of the delays were caused because they did not immediately call the closing agent and make 
their requests for changes in the documents directly to him. Had they informed him that 
they had a facsimile machine, any changes could have been faxed to them instantaneously 
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and the closing could have been completed within a few days of May 1, 1994. Their 
attempts to place the blame for their delays on others is simply disingenuous. 
POINT IV 
ALL DELAYS IN CLOSING ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
LOTTS AND NOT TO KNIGHTON. THEIR EXCUSES FOR 
NOT CLOSING ARE ALL SPURIOUS. 
Lotts attempt to place blame on Knighton for delays in closing and excuse their 
own failure to close by asserting that (1) delivery of documents to his attorney rather than 
to Lotts is not a tender of performance, (2) the sale was contingent upon Knighton's 
successful completion of a percolation test and a survey on the property, (3) the changes 
made in the trust deed at their request did not protect them against water assessments after 
May 1,1994, (4) by June 9, 1994, Lotts had paid the water assessment of $2,800.00, changing 
their basis in the property, (5) because of the delays Knighton suddenly became a credit risk, 
and (6) the Lotts did not receive the installment due under the promissory note on June 1, 
1994. 
All of these claims are spurious on their face. The first is contradicted by their 
own statement on page 27 of their brief that "Marsh was the closing agent." Further, they 
admitted that Knighton's attorney was to be the closing agent in their Summary Judgment 
Memorandum [R. 223,11 4] and they have not disputed that Knighton signed the documents 
and left them and the down payment with the closing agent on April 29, 1994. It is, 
therefore, without dispute that Knighton performed his side of the closing by this date. 
Delivery of the documents to the Lotts is not required without a simultaneous delivery of 
the deed by the Lotts in return. That, of course, is the reason a closing agent is used in such 
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transactions-so that both sides can perform through an intermediary without waiting for the 
other side to perform first. Knighton not only performed by the May 1, 1994, closing date 
but the Lotts were informed of his performance by the letter sent to them on April 29, 1994. 
Completion of the closing was entirely up to the Lotts. 
The Lotts' claim that Knighton "never fully performed" because the sale was 
contingent upon the successful completion of a percolation test and a survey is another 
spurious claim. Their memorandum admits that Knighton waived the percolation test [R. 
224, II 6] and Mr. Lott admits in his affidavit that Knighton told him on April 29, 1994, "that 
all was in order and the survey was complete." [Dennis Lott Affidavit, R. 87, H 10]. The 
claim that Knighton did not perform by the closing date is contrary to the Lotts' own 
affidavits. Furthermore, Mrs. Lott admitted that the survey contingency was requested 
by Knighton. [R. 76, 11 2]. A telling factor is that the Lotts made no complaint about the 
lack of a survey at any time during the delays in closing and did not even assert the lack of 
a survey as a contingency to closing until they filed their motion for summary judgment in 
June, 1995. Lotts' attorney admitted that fact. [R. 38-39]. Therefore, it was clearly not a 
consideration when they refused to perform on June 7, 1994y and was not a cause for delay 
in the closing. 
The claim that the trust deed did not protect the Lotts against assessments after 
May 1, 1994, is also spurious. The trust deed provided that Knighton agrees to pay "all taxes 
and assessments on the above property, to pay all charges and assessments on water or 
water stock used on or with said property." [R. 62, Exh. "D" to Exh. C in Appellants' 
Addendum]. Therefore, any assessments of any kind are Knighton's responsibility. Because 
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Lotts knew that there was a water assessment about to be made, they requested specific-
language to protect them against that assessment and all assessments after May 1, 1994.. 
Language was added to the trust deed to make it read that Knighton "agrees to pay all taxes 
and assessments on the above property from May 1, 1994, to the extent not already paid by 
[Lotts], to pay all charges and assessments on water or water stock used on or with said 
property from May 1, 1994." [R. 70, Exh. "J" to Exh. C in Appellants' Addendum]. 
Knighton was obligated by this language to pay all assessments after May 1, 1994. The 
language "to the extent not already paid by Beneficiaries" applies only to taxes and regular 
assessments and does not apply to water assessments. It could not obligate the Lotts to pay 
the water assessment. Because of delays in getting this new trust deed signed by Knighton 
and in contacting Lotts to fax a copy to them, this revised trust deed did not reach the Lotts 
until after June 9, 1994. [R. 69, Exh. T to Exh. C in Appellants' Addendum]. The Lotts 
had already reneged on the agreement by telephone on June 7, 1994, before they had even 
seen this revised trust deed. For them to now argue that this language in the trust deed was 
a reason for not closing is fraudulent since they had not even seen that language at the time 
they reneged. 
The Lotts next claim that they had paid the $2800.00 water assessment prior 
to June 7, 1994, [R.80, 1f 17; R. 90, U 25] and that this had increased their basis in the 
property. We have already dealt with this claim by explaining that the Lotts should have 
sent the water assessment to Knighton for payment or requested his attorney to make sure 
the assessment was paid as a part of the closing since Knighton was obligated to pay the 
water assessment. But again, the telling factor here is that Lotts had not paid the water 
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assessment. When their attorney requested reimbursement for assessments paid after 
judgment had been entered, he forwarded a copy of the assessment record from Hi-Country 
Estates which shows the assessment of $2800.00 having been made on May 20, 1994, but not 
having been paid until June 25, 1994. [See Accounts Receivable Ledger attached to Exh. 
S in Appellee's Addendum]. The Lotts have a habit of falsely asserting facts as an excuse 
for their failure to perform. They, in fact, had not paid the assessment on June 7, 1994, 
when they reneged. After the law suit was filed, they falsely stated they had paid the 
assessment earlier in order to support their failure to perform. 
The assertion that Knighton suddenly became a credit risk as an excuse for 
Lotts' failure to perform is another attempt to create a bogus issue. The agreement for the 
sale of the property provided for deferred payments from Knighton under a promissory note 
secured by a trust deed on the property. No provision was made that Knighton's credit was 
to be approved. The Lotts had already agreed to accept his credit-worthiness what ever it 
was. This claim was first asserted by Lotts in the motion for summary judgment filed one 
year after they had refused to perform. It was not in their minds at the time of their refusal 
and would be totally irrelevant if it had been. They had no right to renege on the 
agreement because they suddenly became concerned about Knighton's credit status. They 
were secured by the property and could have foreclosed on it if payments were not made. 
The final claim that they did not receive from Knighton the installment due 
under the promissory note that was due June 1, 1994, is also a bogus claim. The agreement 
provided that payments under the note were to begin one month after closing. The note 
was prepared assuming a closing as of May 1, 1994. But the note would not be effective 
32 
until the transaction actually closed by having the Lotts sign and return the warranty deed. 
Did they actually believe they were entitled to receive payments under the note before they 
delivered the deed? The note would not even be delivered to them until the deed had been 
recorded. They did not give any notice of their refusal to deliver a deed until June 7, 1994. 
Under the agreement they were not entitled to payments until one month after they closed. 
To attempt to justify their refusal to perform because they had not received a payment that 
was not due is ludicrous. 
All of these excuses for not performing are spurious but they are consistent with 
all of the assertions made by the Lotts throughout these proceedings. They have asserted 
that Knighton didn't tender his performance when Knighton completed his part of the 
transaction on April, 29, 1994. They themselves, however, did not ever tender their 
performance. They claimed that they had chosen Utah Title Company to provide title 
insurance and to close the transaction [R. 77, 11 4; R. 85, 11 3] when it was common 
knowledge that Utah Title Company had been out of business for years. They have tried 
to shift the burden of obtaining a title report and scheduling a closing, which the agreement 
clearly places on them, to Knighton as an excuse for their failure to do so. They have not 
even addressed the issue of their failure to have clear title to the property which made it 
impossible for them to close. Only the voluntary efforts of Knighton's attorney resolved this 
problem for them. When the appeal was filed with a $300 cost bond and no supersedeas 
bond filed, Knighton tendered to Lotts' attorney all amounts due after deducting the 
attorney's fees awarded, as provided in the lower court's order. They however, rejected that 
tender and thereafter filed a supersedeas bond for the amount of the attorney's fees in an 
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attempt to get around the court's order. They then demanded payment from Knighton for 
interest and assessments which were not due and the amounts which had been tendered but 
rejected and threatened foreclosure for nonpayment of those amounts. They in fact 
commenced proceedings to foreclose for nonpayment of those amounts. When Knighton 
paid them everything they demanded, they made a new demand for an additional $6,000 for 
attorney's fees and other interest they claimed were due. 
When all of these matters are considered together, one sees a consistent and 
constant pattern of false, fraudulent and frivolous claims which have delayed the inevitable 
and wasted the time and resources of this and the lower court as well as deprived Knighton 
of the use of the property for nearly two years and caused him to pay many thousands of 
dollars in attorney's fees and other unjustified charges. 
POINT V 
KNIGHTON IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
THIS APPEAL AND THE MERGER DOCTRINE HAS NO 
APPLICATION HERE. 
The attorney's fees awarded by the lower court were based on a provision in 
the agreement between the parties which mandates the payment of such fees by the 
defaulting party. That agreement, however, is only one of the grounds asserted for the 
awarding of attorney's fees on this appeal. Lotts have claimed in their brief that the merger 
doctrine precludes an award of fees on this appeal because, as they claim, their delivery of 
the deed in compliance with the court's order extinguishes the agreement between the 
parties. The merger doctrine is properly applied when a party accepts a deed in fulfillment 
of the terms of an earnest money agreement which provides that the delivery of such a deed 
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is full performance of the seller's obligation. The buyer may not then sue for a breach of 
warranties under the deed and claim attorney's fees under the prior and completely 
performed earnest money agreement. He is left to his remedies under the warranties in the 
deed which he accepted. That is the holding of the cases cited by Lotts in their brief and 
that principle is not disputed. 
However, Knighton is not suing for breach of the warranties in the deed. His 
claim was for specific performance of the underlying Earnest Money Sales Agreement. The 
lower court entered a judgment for specific performance and properly awarded fees under 
the agreement. Knighton did not appeal from that decision. He is here simply to defend 
the judgment already entered. That defense and the fees incurred by him on this appeal are 
a necessary extension of his claim for specific performance below. In fact, he is still 
defending the terms of that agreement. This appeal, therefore, is still part of the claims 
under that agreement and the attorney's fee provision of that agreement still applies. It has 
not been extinguished nor abrogated. 
There is an exception to the merger doctrine "if the original contract calls for 
performance by the seller of some act collateral to conveyance of title." G.G.A., Inc. v. 
Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1989). Collateral to the obligation of the Lotts to 
convey title is their agreement to pay costs and attorney's fees incurred by Knighton to force 
them to convey that title, including the costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending the 
resulting judgment. 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have upheld the principle that 
attorney's fees are to be awarded in defending an appeal where fees were properly awarded 
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below. Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d 622, 623, 625 (Utah 1985), like this case, was a case 
where fees were awarded for services in defending an appeal arising out of an action to 
enforce a uniform real estate contract. The court there held that such fees were "a matter 
of legal right." This Court, in Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah App. 1989), also 
awarded fees on the appeal because "we interpret the contractual provision allowing attorney 
fees 'in connection with litigation' to include appeals." The agreement in this case provides 
for attorney's fees "which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy 
is pursued by filing suit or otherwise." This appeal is part of the litigation made necessary 
in this case and fees on appeal should be awarded as a matter of legal right. 
The principle in those cases was first established in Utah when the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the majority rule applicable in the United States. In Management 
Services Corp. v. Development Associates. 617 P.2d 406, 408-9 (Utah 1980), the court held: 
The majority of jurisdictions have recognized that the 
contractual obligation to pay attorney's fees incurred in enforcing 
a contract should include those incurred on appeal. . . . 
The parties here agreed to pay reasonable attorney's fees if it 
became necessary to enforce the contract. If plaintiff is required 
to defend its position on appeal at its own expense plaintiffs 
rights under the contract are thereby diminished. We therefore 
adopt the rule of law that a provision for payment of attorney's 
fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the 
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is 
brought to enforce the contract, . . . 
That rule has since been followed in numerous other cases. Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 
393 (Utah 1984); Cabrera v. Cottrell supra; G.G A Inc. v. Leventis, supra at 846; Schmidt 
v. Downs, 775 P.2d 427, 431 (Utah App. 1989); Cobabe v. Crawford, supra. 
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Furthermore, Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, mandates the award 
of damages, which may include attorney's fees, against a party or his attorney, if it 
determines that the appeal was either frivolous or for delay. The recitation of the false, 
fraudulent and frivolous arguments made by Lotts in Point IV above, along with the 
dismissal of the appeal on the merits as moot, certainly justifies a determination that this 
whole case, including the appeal, was frivolous. An award of attorney's fees for defending 
this appeal should follow. 
CONCLUSION 
The dismissal of this appeal on the merits of the case left only the question of 
the reasonableness of the attorney's fees awarded below. The reasonableness of those fees 
has not been challenged by the Lotts. The recoverability of those fees is a matter of legal 
right and, therefore, the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
The Lotts have attempted to use the issue of attorney's fees to reargue the 
merits of the decision which was dismissed for mootness. There is no need for this Court 
to review the merits. However, if the Court is inclined to look at those issues, it should be 
clear that time was not the essence of the agreement, that Knighton fully closed his side of 
the agreement before the closing date, that all delays in closing were to accommodate 
requests made by Lotts and that Lotts did not ever tender their performance. Therefore, 
the lower court properly ordered specific performance of the agreement. 
Knighton was entitled to the fees awarded to him below and is likewise entitled 
to be awarded the fees incurred in defending the appeal as a matter of legal right. The 
continuation of this case by the Lotts after it became moot as well as their many spurious 
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arguments and false claims of fact both below and on this appeal have been either frivolous 
or only for delay and further justifies an award of attorney's fees to Knighton on this appeal. 
This Court should, therefore, affirm the decision of the lower court and award 
Knighton his attorney's fees and costs incurred on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh! 
Attorneys for Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the day of December, 1996,1 mailed two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, postage prepaid, to the following: 
MARK A. LARSEN 
KRISTINE EDDE 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
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EXHIBIT P Knighton Complaint 
EXHIBIT Q Lott Answer 
EXHIBIT R Cost Bond on Appeal 
EXHIBIT S Larsen Letter to Marsh 
EXHIBIT T Marsh Letter to Larsen 
EXHIBIT U Suggestion of Mootness and Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal for Mootness and Request for 
Attorney's Fees 
EXHIBIT V Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal for Mootness 
EXHIBIT W Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal for Mootness 
EXHIBIT X Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal for Mootness 
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RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON, | 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS A. LOTT and 





For his cause of action against defendants, plaintiff alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendants are residents of the State of Pennsylvania but the real 
property involved in this action is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and the 
agreement between the parties was entered into and was to be performed in the 
State of Utah. 
3. On January 29, 1994, plaintiff presented to defendants a written offer 
to purchase certain real property for $35,000.00, payable $200.00 as earnest money, 
$3300.00 down payment at closing and $31,500.00 on a promissory note secured by 
a trust deed against the property. The real property to be purchasers located in Salt 
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Lake County, State of Utah, known as Lot 113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase II, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning South 870.83 feet and East 2499.13 feet 
from the West Quarter Corner of Section 21, 
Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence North 71 ° 22'15" 
West 582.27 feet;thence North 18 • 37'45" East 
353.01 feet; thence Easterly along a curve to the 
right 704 feet; thence South 53°48'29M East 304.13 
feet; thence South 36°11'31M West 649.01 feet to 
the point ofbeginning, containing 10.48 acres. 
4. On February 7, 1994, defendants accepted the offer subject to 
changing the amount of earnest money to $1,000.00 and reducing the down payment 
to $2,500.00. 
5. This counteroffer was accepted by plaintiff on February 17, 1994. 
6. The agreement between the parties is an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", which provides, among 
other things, as follows: 
a) The closing shall take place upon receipt of survey but no later 
than May 1, 1994, at a reasonable location to be designated by 
Seller, 
b) Seller shall provide to Buyer, not less than five days prior to 
closing, a preliminary title report on the subject property; 
c) Seller shall convey title to Buyer by warranty deed free of 
defects; 
c) Seller shall furnish good and marketable title to the property 
evidenced by a current policy of title insurance in the amount of the 
purchase price containing no exceptions other than those provided 
for in the standard form policy; 
d) The agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written 
agreement of the parties; 
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e) Should either party default, the defaulting party shall pay all 
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may 
arise or accrue from enforcing the agreement or in pursuing any 
remedy provided by the agreement or by applicable law, whether 
such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. 
7. Defendants failed to designate a location for the closing of the sale. 
8. Defendants failed to provide to plaintiff a preliminary title report 
within five days prior to May 1, 1994, or at any time since. 
9. Plaintiff, therefore, contacted defendants by telephone and obtained 
their permission, on April 26, 1994, to have his attorney obtain a preliminary title 
report and prepare the necessary closing papers. 
10. A preliminary title report was ordered but not received until Monday, 
May 2, 1994. 
11. Plaintiff deposited the down payment with his attorney and signed a 
promissory note, trust deed and closing statement and left those with his attorney on 
Friday, April 29, 1994. Copies of those documents are attached hereto as Exhibits 
"B", "C" and "D". 
12. On Friday, April 29, 1994, a closing statement and warranty deed 
were prepared and sent to defendants by plaintiffs attorney with a cover letter 
requesting defendants to sign and return those documents and to call if they had any 
questions. Copies of those documents are attached hereto as Exhibits "E" and "F". 
13. On May 3, 1994, defendant Dennis Lott called plaintiff to request 
that a copy of the note and trust deed be sent to them and that charges for owner's 
assessments and a closing fee be deleted from the closing statement. 
14. On May 6, 1994, plaintiffs attorney sent a revised closing statement 
and copies of the note and trust deed to defendants with a cover letter requesting 
defendants again to sign and return the closing statement and deed and to call if they 
had any questions. Copies of the letter and revised closing statement are attached 
as Exhibits "G" and "H". 
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15. On May 16,1994, defendant Dennis Lott called plaintiff and informed 
him that defendants knew that a water assessment was about to be made against the 
property and they did not want to pay that assessment and requested a change in the 
trust deed to provide for that. Plaintiff informed defendant that he, the plaintiff, 
would pay that assessment when it was made. This information was conveyed to 
plaintiffs attorney on May 20, 1994, with a request that he call defendants to discuss 
the matter. 
16. Plaintiffs attorney was able to reach defendants on May 24, 1994, 
when they requested him to prepare a new trust deed providing that plaintiff pay all 
assessments, and specifically water assessments, after May 1, 1994, to have it signed 
by plaintiff and then to call them by telephone so that they could turn on their fax 
machine and have a copy of the new trust deed faxed to them. 
17. Because plaintiff was not able to come into his attorney's office 
immediately to sign the new trust deed, the new trust deed was mailed to him on 
May 27, 1994. It was returned to plaintiffs attorney on May 31, 1994. 
18. Plaintiffs attorney was not able to reach defendants until June 7, 
1994, when he was able to speak with defendant Francine Lott. She informed him 
that she did not know how to turn the fax machine on and would have to wait until 
her husband was available. She was requested to have defendant Dennis Lott call 
when he was available. 
19. In the evening of June 7, defendant Dennis Lott called plaintiff and 
told him they wanted to terminate the agreement. 
20. One June 9, 1994, plaintiffs attorney sent to defendants a copy of the 
new trust deed revised as requested by defendants with a cover letter requesting that 
defendants sign and return the closing statement and deed. Copies of that letter an 
trust deed are attached hereto as Exhibits "I11 and MJ". 
21. On June 16, 1994, defendants caused their attorney to send a letter 
to plaintiffs attorney informing him that the agreement had been terminated. 
22. By further letters of June 21, 1994, and July 8, 1994, and telephone 
discussions, the parties have not been able to resolve the matter. 
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23. Plaintiff has performed everything he was required to do in order to 
close the sale of the property described above from defendants to plaintiff. 
24. Defendants have defaulted in failing and refusing to close the sale of 
the property. 
25. Plaintiff has tendered to defendants the $3,500.00 down payment and 
hereby tenders to defendants such sum and, pursuant to Rule 67, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, plaintiff hereby moves the Court for an order that the $3,500.00 down 
payment be deposited into Court pending the Court's order as to the distribution 
thereof. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
26. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1 through 25 above. 
27. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of specific performance requiring 
defendants to convey title to the property to him in return for the down payment 
paid by plaintiff and the note and trust deed signed by him. 
28. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants his costs and attorney's 
fees incurred by him in pursuing this matter. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
29. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1 through 25 above. 
30. In the alternative, plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants all 
damages suffered by him as a result of defendants' breach of the agreement. 
31. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants his costs and attorney's 
fees incurred by him in pursuing this matter. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for a decree and judgment against 
defendants as follows: 
1. Under his first cause of action for a decree of specific performance 
requiring defendants to convey good and marketable title to the property described 
above to plaintiff by a warranty deed. 
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2. In the alternative, under his second cause of action for a judgment 
against defendants in the amount of all damages suffered by plaintiff as a result of 
defendants' breach of the agreement. 
3. Under either cause of action for a judgment for all costs and attorney's 
fees incurred by plaintiff in pursuing this matter. 
DATED this 2£ day of July, 1994. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh / 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs address: 
5890 South Kingston Way 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON, : 
Plaintiff, : ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM 
: AND JURY DEMAND 
vs. : 
DENNIS A. LOTT and : 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, : Civil No. 940904746PR 
Defendants. : Judge Tyron E. Medley 
Defendants Dennis A. and Francine G. Lott ("Mr. and 
Mrs. Lott") answer Plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
1. Admitted. 
2. Admitted, with the exception that Pennsylvania is a 
Commonwealth rather than a State. 
3. Admitted. 
4. Admitted, with the exception of any implication that 
additional action by Mr. Knighton was unnecessary. Mr. Knighton 
was under an obligation to deposit the additional Earnest Money 
into Ralph Marsh's Trust Account. 
5. Admitted. 
6. The terms of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, which 
is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A, speaks for itself. 
To the extent any further response is required, the averments 
in paragraph 6 of the Complaint are denied. 
7. Denied. 
8. Denied. Mr. and Mrs. Lott affirmatively allege that 
Mr. Knighton agreed to obtain a preliminary title report. 
9. Mr. & Mrs. Lott admit that Plaintiff Kerry L. Knighton 
("Mr. Knighton") agreed to obtain the title report, but deny the 
remaining averments of paragraph 9 of the Complaint. 
10. Mr. and Mrs. Lott have insufficient information with 
which to form a belief as to the truth of the averments 
contained in paragraph 10 of the Complaint and, therefore, deny 
them. 
11. Mr. and Mrs. Lott have insufficient information with 
which to form a belief as to the truth of the averments 
contained in paragraph 11 of the Complaint and, therefore, deny 
them. 
12. Mr. and Mrs. Lott admit that they received a letter 
from Mr. Marsh dated April 29, 1994, but did not receive the 
letter until after the agreed upon closing date, affirmatively 
allege that the letter and enclosed documents speak for 
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themselves, and deny that the letter and enclosed documents are 
attached as Exhibits E and F to the Complaint. 
13. Admitted. 
14. Mr. and Mrs. Lott admit receipt of the letter dated 
May 6, 1994, allege that the letter and documents speak for 
themselves, but deny the remaining averments of paragraph 14 of 
the Complaint. 
15. Denied. 
16. Mr. and Mrs. Lott admit that Mr. Lott telephoned Mr. 
Marsh on May 24, 1994, and requested Mr. Marsh to prepare a new 
Trust Deed providing that Mr. Knighton would pay all 
assessments, and specifically water assessments, after May 1, 
1994, to have the new document signed by Mr. Knighton, and then 
send the document to them after 6:00 p.m. by facsimile and, 
failing that method of transmittal, to send it to them by 
overnight courier. Mr. and Mrs. Lott deny the remaining 
averments contained in paragraph 16 ot rhe Complaint. 
17. Mr. and Mrs. Lott are without sufficient knowledge or 
information with which to form a belief as to paragraph 17 of 
the Complaint and, therefore, deny them. 
18. Mr. and Mrs. Lott admit that Mr. Marsh and Mrs. Lott 
had a conversation on June 7, 1994, but deny the remaining 
averments of paragraph 18 of the Complaint. Mr. and Mrs. Lott 
affirmatively allege that Mrs. Lott told Mr. Marsh that, due to 
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Mr. Knighton's default, they we no longer interested in pursuing 
the matter. 
19. Denied. 
20. Mr. and Mrs. Lott admit receipt of Mr. Marsh's letter 
dated June 9, 1994, allege that the letter and enclosed 
documents speak for themselves, and deny the remaining averments 
contained in paragraph 20 of the Complaint, including the 





25. Mr. and Mrs. Lott admit that Mr. Knighton tendered 
$3,500, but deny that the tender was made in a timely manner and 
deny the remaining averments of paragraph 25 of the Complaint. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
26. Mr. and Mrs. Lott incorporate by reference their 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 25 of the Complaint. 
27. Denied. 
28. Denied. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
29. Mr. and Mrs. Lott incorporate by reference their 




FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement states that time is of 
the essence, requiring Mr. Knighton to tender his performance 
as of the closing date of May 1, 1994. Therefore, Mr. and Mrs. 
Lott are discharged from their contractual obligations because 
Mr. Knighton did not tender his performance by the agreed 
closing date, May 1, 1994. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement did not close on May 1, 
1994, the agreed upon closing date, due solely to delays caused 
by Mr. Knighton or his attorney, Mr. Marsh. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Mr. Knighton waived the claims set forth in the Complaint. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Mr. Knighton is estopped from asserting the claims set 
forth in the Complaint. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Mr. Knighton breached the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
precluding him from recovering for the claims set forth in the 
Complaint. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. and Mrs. Lott request that the Court dismiss 
the Complaint with prejudice, that they be awarded their 
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attorneys' fees and costs, that they be awarded the Earnest 
Money Deposit of $1,000 plus interest from May 2, 1994, and that 
they be awarded such other and further relief as the Court may 
deem appropriate. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For their counterclaim against Mr. Knighton, Mr. and Mrs. 
Lott incorporate by reference the Complaint and Jury Demand in 
the case captioned "Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott v. Kerry 
L. Knighton and Ralph J. Marsh," Civil No. 940904735PR, filed 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action. 
JURY DEMAND 
Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 38(b), Mr. & Mrs. Lott demand a trial 
by jury of any issue triable of right by jury and tender the 
statutory jury fee upon the filing of this Answer and 
Counterclaim. 
DATED: August 22, 1994. 
CAMPBELL MAACpK & SESSIONS 
£4j\$*Asy 
A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of August, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of Defendants' ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND 
JURY DEMAND was mailed by United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 




MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
COST BOND ON APPEAL 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Pursuant to Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Plaintiffs Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott pay 
into the Registry of the Court the enclosed check in the amount 
of $300.00 to be held as a cost bond on appeal. 
DATED: September 14, 1995. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
LA. A^fi*-^ lark A, Larsen 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /J> day of September, 1995, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was 
served via United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 





CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L CORPORATION 
ROBERT s. CAMPBELL, JR. ATTORNEYS AT LAW TELEPHONE 
ROBERT D. MAACK r C M T C D ( S O 1 ) 5 3 7 ' 5 5 5 5 
CLARK w. SESSIONS ONE UTAH CENTER 
E. BARNEY GESAS T H I R T E E N T H FLOOR 
KEVIN EGAN ANDE^SON 20t SOUTH MAIN STREET 
MARTIN R. DENNEY
 U T A H Q ^ , , . ^ F A C S I M I L E 
TRACY H. TOWLER « " ( S O I ) 5 3 7 - 5 I 9 9 
MARK A. LARSEN V ' 
PERRIN R. LOVE 
DEAN C. A N D R E A S E N 
WILLIAM H. C H R I S T ^ M S E N 
JAY W. BUTLER 
JOANN SHIELDS September 14, 1995 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. HAND DELIVERED 
Backm&n, Clark & Marsh 
800 Mcmtyre Bldg. 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Lott v. Knighton 
Civil No. 940904735 PR 
Escrow Instructions 
Dear Ralph: 
Enclosed is the Warranty Deed for the Lottfs property and the 
accounting which must be satisfied prior to your recording the 
Deed. I have broken the accounting down as follows: (a) an 
itemization of payments on the Promissory Note from the time the 
first payment was due until the present, with interest assessed; 
(b) an itemization of monies owed for each assessment the Lotts 
have paid despite your client's contractual obligation to do so, 
also with interest assessed. 
1. Payments on the Promissory Note. 
Each monthly payment was $461.48. Interest is calculated at 
the legal rate of 10% per annum simple interest. The first payment 
on th$ Note was due June 1, 1994, over fifteen and one-half months 
ago. 
PAYMENT INTEREST TOTAL 
6/1/94 $461.48 $59.68 $521.16 
7/1/94 461.48 55.83 517.31 
8/9/94 461.48 51.98 513.46 
9/1/94 461.48 48.13 509.61 
10/1/94 461.48 44.28 505.76 
C A M P B E L L M A A C K & SESSIONS 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 

















































2. Unpaid Assessments. 
The assessments listed below were paid by the Lotts despite 
















Enclosed are copies of documents reflecting the preceding 
assessments. 
CAMPBELL M A A C K & SESSIONS 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq, 
September 14, 1995 
Page 3 
In addition, Mr. & Mrs. Lott are entitled to the Earnest Money 
Deposit and Down Payment totaling $3,500.00 set forth in the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated January 27, 1994, which we 
understand was deposited in your Trust Account. 
The total amount your client owes the Lotts is $15,384.66. 
Once Mr. Knighton deposits these amounts owed to the Lotts into 
your Trust Account, and you prepare and deliver to me a check 
payable to Mr. & Mrs. Lott for that amount, you may record the 
Warranty Deed. 
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. 
Very truly yours, 
CAMPBELL MAACK &# SESSIONS ELL MAACK S* SESSIONS 
14- L&&— 
























Description O f f s e t - # Document 
feci) W-?1W 
( 2 * 5 + 3 4 ^ * 5 2 5 LOTT, DENNIS BALANCE FORWARD 
CK 4773 200.4000 910110 
CK 4363 200.1000 930701 
CK 4363 200.3000 930701 
1ST HALF 93-94 ASSES 200.1000 930801 
ROAD IMPROVEMENT PRJ 200.3000 930801 
2ND HALF ASSESS 200. 1000 940101 
WATERLINE ASSESSMENT 
TOTALS 
































HI-COUNTRY ESTATES, PHASE II 




*y Date Description Offset-# Document Due 
*T1) LOTT, DENNIS (215)343-4525 
060194 BALANCE FORWARD 
062594 CK 214 0.0000 940606 -393 
070594 1994-95 ASSESSMENT 420.0000 940705 -383 




- 2800.00 - 2800.00 
316.00 316.00 
-316.00 -316.00 
TOTALS -2800.00 $0.00 




Date Description Offset-# Document Due Current Balance 
3TT1) LOTT, DENNIS (215)343-4525 Limit 0 
063095 BALANCE FORWARD 0# 00 
070195 1995-96 ASSESSMENTS 0.0000 950701 -27 332.00 332.00 
082095 CK 1314 0.0000 950804 22 -332.00 -332.00 
TOTALS 0.00 $0. 00 











































ae C O 
ac 3 > 
r— 





















































- - J 
as 
i 























































































c-> c-4 ho r— 
X O* CD 
I> • C H 
ae so to co 
—4 •—» «- m 
- e n ae 
oo •-
H O t-
CO 3> C*4 
s 
V: 
c_n KJ en 
I I I 
.»» »-— H-
ro cxi en 
V 
TabT 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
RALPH J. MARSH 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
GARY A. SARGENT 
DAVID B. BOYCH 8 0 0 M C I N T Y R E B U I I D I N G 
IUIPHONK (801) 531-8300
 r „ „ 68 SOUTH M A I N 
I AX NUMBLR (801) 363-2420 
S A I T LARK C I T Y , U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 
September 19, 1995 
MR. MARK A. LARSEN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Lott v. Knighton 
Dear Mark: 
Thank you for the warranty deed and assessment record in the above matter. I 
have reviewed the assessment record and your accounting and have determined that the 
road assessment made on June 15, 1993, in the amount of $420.00 is not chargeable to 
Mr. Knighton nor are the Lotts entitled to interest on the assessments or installments 
due under the note. The road assessment was assessed and paid long before the 
property was sold to Knighton. Interest on the assessments and the installments due 
under the note is not payable until the deed has been recorded. Otherwise, Mr, 
Knighton would be entitled to interest on the full amount of the transaction or some 
greater amount related to the value of the property for his lack of use of the property 
from May 1, 1994. The installments should be credited as if paid when due under the 
note. In actuality, no installments should be due under the note until delivery of the 
deed since the earnest money agreement provided for installments to begin one month 
after closing. They are thus receiving an advance payment of some $10,000.00. 
Therefore, I have enclosed our trust check in the amount of $14,406.68, less 
$8,845.50 for the costs and fees awarded, since no supersedeas bond has been filed. 
That amount was arrived at by totalling sixteen installments under the note at $461.48 
each, plus the water assessment of $2800.00, the 1994-95 annual assessment of $316.00, 
the 1995-96 assessment of $332.00, three months or one-fourth oi the 1993-94 
assessment which equals $75.00 and the down payment of $3,500.00. Deducting the 
fees and costs awarded of $8,845.50 leaves a balance o\' $5,561.18. 
MR. MARK A. LARSEN 
September 19, 1995 
Page 2 
Enclosed also with this check is the promissory note signed by Mr. Knighton. The 
trust deed securing that note has been sent tor recording along with the deed which you 
sent to me. 
I know it was your intent that the deed not be recorded unless interest was paid 
on the amounts you claimed to be due but I also assume you were attempting to comply 
with the Court's order to deliver the deed within thirty days. If you were to insist upon 
payment of the interest, then the deed would have been delivered only conditionally 
and, therefore, not in compliance with the Court's order. Since the result of that would 
have been a decree by the Court vesting title to the property in Mr. Knighton, the 
recording of the deed does not harm your clients' interests. In fact, it furthers your 
clients' interests since the trust deed is also being recorded and the promissory note 
delivered. 
If for some reason you disagree with this, you may apply to the Court for a ruling 
on whether interest is due on the unpaid assessments and installments. We would, of 
course, then ask for interest or damages for loss of use of the property from May 1, 
1994. The Court's order, as you know, did not require the payment of interest to either 
side. 
This procedure makes much more sense than to return the deed to you until you 
have made an unconditional delivery thus creating a new dispute over whether the 
Court's order has been complied with and whether Knighton is current in making the 
payments. If you disagree, you should return the enclosed check and promissory note 
and apply to the Court for a ruling. 
Yours truly, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
RJM/rm 
cc: Kerry L. Knighton 
TabU 
RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS A. LOTT and 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants-Appellees. 
SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS 
AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
APPEAL FOR MOOTNESS AND 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Case No. 950760-CA 
Defendants-Appellees hereby move the Court to dismiss the appeal filed by 
Plaintiffs-Appellants on the grounds that all of the issues on this appeal are now moot. 
This motion is supported by the MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FOR MOOTNESS AND REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES and AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
APPEAL FOR MOOTNESS filed herewith. 
DATED this Jt_ day of February, 1996. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the _ day of February, 1996,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS AND MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FOR 
MOOTNESS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TabV 
RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS A. LOTT and 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants-Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
APPEAL FOR MOOTNESS AND 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S Fl 
Case No. 950760-CA 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter "Lotts"), as sellers, and defendant-appellee 
Knighton (hereinafter "Knighton"), as buyer, signed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement in 
January and February, 1994, providing for the sale of the property known as Lot 113, Hi-
Country Estates, Phase II, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (hereinafter "Property"), and 
providing that Lotts, as Sellers, were to provide a preliminary title report to Knighton five 
business days before the closing and to designate a place for closing. [Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, attached to Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Request for 
Attorney's Fees (hereinafter "Order"), p. 2, HI]. 
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2. On April 26, 1994, Lotts, through Knighton, either requested or gave their 
permission for Mr. Marsh to obtain a preliminary title report and prepare the closing papers. 
[Order, p. 2, H2]. 
3. Knighton tendered his performance of the agreement on April 29, 1994, by 
depositing the down payment and delivering an executed promissory note and trust deed on 
the Property with Mr. Marsh. [Order, p.2, H3]. 
4. Mr. Marsh forwarded to Lotts, who were residing in Pennsylvania a closing 
statement and warranty deed for their signatures on April 29, 1994, which they received by 
May 3, 1994. 
5. During the next thirty plus days, Lotts called requesting copies of other 
documents and changes in the documents but did not ever tender their performance of the 
agreement. [Order, p.3, 117]. 
6. Lotts filed this action to terminate the agreement and obtain a judgment for 
the earnest money and Knighton filed an action for specific performance of the agreement. 
The two actions were consolidated. 
7. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment asserting the material facts 
were undisputed. The lower court granted summary judgment for Knighton and signed an 
order to that effect on August 18, 1995. That judgment ordered the Lotts to deliver a 
warranty deed conveying the Property to Knighton and the delivery of the note and trust 
deed to Lotts for the balance due under the agreement. [Order, p.3, 113]. 
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8. A Notice of Appeal and a $300.00 Cost Bond on Appeal were filed by Lotts 
on September 15, 1995. No stay of the judgment was sought by Lotts and no supersedeas 
bond was filed to stay the execution of the judgment. [Affidavit, 113]. 
9. The warranty deed was delivered to Knighton on September 14, 1995, and 
the note and trust deed were delivered to Lotts on September 19, 1995. On that same date 
the down payment and all payments due under the promissory note from June 1, 1994, 
through September 1, 1995, and assessments against the Property, totaling $14,406.68, less 
the attorney's fees awarded by the lower court, were tendered to Lotts. [Affidavit in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss Appeal (hereinafter "Affidavit"), 114]. 
10. That tender was rejected by Lotts on September 20, 1995. [Affidavit, 115]. 
11. The monthly installment due under the promissory note was sent by 
Knighton to Lotts on October 10, 1995, and retained by them. [Affidavit, H6]. 
12. On October 23, 1995, Lotts caused the trustee under the trust deed to 
record with the Salt Lake County Recorder and serve upon Knighton a Notice of Default 
claiming a default by Knighton under the promissory note and trust deed, accelerating the 
balance due and electing to sell the Property at trustee's sale. [Affidavit, H7]. 
13. On January 4, 1996, Knighton paid to Lotts' trustee the sum of $38,734.54 
to pay the entire balance of the note, plus interest, assessments and the down payment. 
[Affidavit, 118]. 
14. On January 18, 1996, Lotts demanded an additional $6,081.35 from 
Knighton to pay interest accrued before judgment and before delivery of the deed, additional 
assessments and attorney's fees incurred even though there was no default. [Affidavit, 119]. 
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15. On January 22, 1996, Knighton paid to Lotts the additional $6,081.35 
demanded by Lotts. This amount was paid under protest to put an end to Lotts' claims for 
further interest, fees, etc. [Affidavit, 1110]. 
16. On January 23, 1996, Lotts caused a deed of reconveyance to be delivered 
to Knighton, which was recorded January 24, 1996, thereby releasing any security interest 
in the Property. [Affidavit, II11]. 
ARGUMENT 
LOTTS' CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY, DEMAND 
FOR AND ACCEPTANCE OF PAYMENT OF THE BALANCE 
DUE AND RECONVEYANCE OF ITS TRUST DEED 
CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL AND 
RENDER THEIR APPEAL MOOT. 
The Lotts' whole purpose in bringing this action and filing their appeal was to 
obtain a termination of their contract to sell the Property. The District Court denied them 
such relief and ordered the contract specifically performed. The Lotts performed the 
contract by delivering the deed. They went further, however, and demanded payment of the 
full amount of the note even though there was no default by Knighton. Knighton paid the 
full amount demanded even though he did not owe those amounts. Lotts accepted payment 
in full and reconveyed their security against the Property. There is, therefore, nothing 
further to be decided by their appeal. 
By acquiescing in and accepting the benefits under the judgment Lotts are 
challenging on appeal, they have lost their right to appeal. In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 
(Utah 1987), a case just like this one, the seller was ordered to specifically perform his 
contract to sell a ranch to buyer by conveying the ranch to buyer and setting up a payment 
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schedule for the buyer. The seller appealed the order but did not file a supersedeas bond. 
Instead he moved from the ranch and accepted over $70,000 in payments tendered by the 
buyer. In holding that "the seller lost his right to appeal by acquiescing in and accepting 
benefits under the judgment he now assails," the Supreme Court stated, at 613: 
By giving up possession of the property and accepting the 
money tendered by buyer, seller has waived his right to appeal. 
As a general rule, one who accepts a benefit under a judgment is 
estopped from later attacking the judgment on appeal and one 
who acquiesces in a judgment cannot later attack it. In 
Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190,193, 188 
P. 1117, 1118 (1920), the plaintiff sued to recover land in the 
possession of the defendant, who allegedly occupied the premises 
under a lease from the plaintiff. The plaintiff was awarded a 
judgment after trial, and the defendant moved from the land. 
Although the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs attorney explaining 
that he did not intend to waive his right to appeal by moving off 
the land, we held against the defendant, stating: "It is elementary 
that in case a party to an action accepts the benefits of a 
judgment in his favor or acquiesces in a judgment against him he 
thereby waives his right to have said judgment reviewed on 
appeal." 56 Utah at 193, 188 P. at 1118 (citations omitted); see 
also Hollingsworth v. Farmers Insurance Co., 655 P.2d 637 (Utah 
1982) (finding no right to appeal when defendant accepted 
payment and executed a written satisfaction of judgment notice). 
Under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine, it is not necessary 
that the judgment have been rendered for the party who is 
estopped by the acceptance of benefits under the judgment. See 
Annot., 169 A.L.R. 985, 993 (1947); Cornia v. Cornia, 80 Utah 
486, 15 P.2d 631 (1932) (defendant in an action to recover land 
accepted allowance for improvement and was estopped to appeal 
from a judgment giving title to plaintiff). We think this rule is 
more than a technicality of common law designed to ensnare the 
unwary; the rule embodies a valid protection of the successful 
party in the trial court. An appellant who accepts the benefits of 
a judgment from which he is appealing accomplishes a significant 
shift in the burden of risk: he exposes the respondent to the 
possibility not only to a possible loss on appeal, but also the 
potential loss of the benefit he has provided to the appellant. For 
example, in this case, seller has taken over $70,000 of buyer's 
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money which, should we reverse on appeal, buyer would have to 
recover from seller, who may not be able or willing to refund it. 
Further, seller has allowed buyer to inconvenience himself by 
moving to the ranch and hiring a staff. 
In short, we think that seller's actions in this matter prevent us 
from reviewing the merits of his appeal. Dismissed. Costs and 
reasonable attorney fees to respondent. [Emphasis supplied]. 
Black v. Alpha Financial Corp., 65 P.2d 409 (Utah 1982), was a similar case in 
which a sales contract was forfeited for default by the buyer but the lower court allowed the 
buyer thirty days to pay the entire unpaid balance of the contract, with interest, attorney's 
fees and costs and retain possession of the property. The buyer paid that balance and 
received a conveyance of the property and then appealed the lower court's decision. The 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with these words, at 410: 
We are unable to consider any of these contentions on their 
merits because the case has been rendered moot by the action of 
the buyer in paying the sellers the balance of the purchase price. 
The sellers no longer have any interest in the property. The buyer 
is the owner. Even if we were to agree with one or more of the 
buyer's contentions, there is no relief that we could afford the 
buyer since he has paid the full purchase price and completely 
extinguished the seller's interest in the property. We cannot 
revive the contract and reinstate the parties to their original 
positions. At the time the judgment below was entered, the buyer, 
without complying with the judgment, could have brought an 
appeal to this Court after posting any necessary supersedeas bond. 
Had that been done, the controversy between the parties would 
still be alive on appeal. Since the buyer did not take that route 
but instead paid the contract balance and received a conveyance 
of the property, all controversy between the parties was settled 
and mooted. [Emphasis supplied]. 
The most recent expression on the issue of mootness was given by the Court 
of Appeals in Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1990), in 
which the parties did not seek a stay of the judgment nor file a supersedeas bond but 
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accepted payment from the court of the proceeds of the judgment in their favor. The Court 
of Appeals dismissed the appeal stating, at 1221: 
Under the general acceptance-of-the benefits doctrine, one who 
accepts a benefit under a judgment is estopped from later 
attacking the judgment on appeal, and one who acquiesces in a 
judgment cannot later attack it. 
This case is no different from those just discussed. The Lotts were ordered to 
specifically perform their contract by conveying the Property and they complied. They 
appealed but filed no supersedeas bond to prevent enforcement of the judgment. They not 
only accepted payments from Knighton but demanded that he pay the entire balance even 
though it was not due. They went further and demanded payment of amounts to which they 
had no right. Knighton paid all of those amounts. Lotts accepted those amounts and 
reconveyed their security in the Property. This case is a stronger case for dismissal of the 
appeal than any of those discussed above because of the Lotts' demand for payment and 
commencement of foreclosure proceedings to force payment from Knighton. There is simply 
no issue left to be decided on this appeal and it should be dismissed as moot. 
Consistent with the Trees case above, Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and the contract between the parties, the Court should award Knighton the 
attorney's fees and costs he has incurred from the time of the judgment in the district court. 
DATED this [£___ day of February, 1996. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh J 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the l& day of February, 1996,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FOR 
MOOTNESS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS A. LOTT and 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants-Appellees. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
APPEAL FOR MOOTNESS AND 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S Fl 
Case No. 950760-CA 
RALPH J. MARSH, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am the attorney for defendants-appellees in the above matter and I have 
personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
2. Judgment was granted by the District Court in favor of defendant 
(hereinafter "Knighton") and against plaintiffs (hereinafter "Lotts") following reciprocal 
motions for summary judgment and an order was entered in the form of the attached Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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3. A Notice of Appeal and a $300.00 Cost Bond on Appeal were filed by Lotts 
on September 15, 1995. No stay of the judgment was sought by Lotts and no supersedeas 
bond was filed to stay the execution of the judgment. 
4. Pursuant to the judgment, the warranty deed was delivered to Knighton's 
attorney on September 14, 1995, the note was delivered to Lotts on September 19, 1995, and 
the trust deed was recorded. On that same date the down payment and all payments due 
under the promissory note from June 1, 1994, through September 1, 1995, and assessments 
against the Property, totaling $14,406.68, less the attorney's fees awarded by the lower court, 
were tendered to Lotts. 
5. That tender was rejected by Lotts on September 20, 1995. 
6. The monthly installment due under the promissory note was sent by 
Knighton to Lotts on October 10, 1995, and retained by them. 
7. On October 23, 1995, Lotts caused the trustee under the trust deed to 
record with the Salt Lake County Recorder and serve upon Knighton a Notice of Default 
claiming a default by Knighton under the promissory note and trust deed, accelerating the 
balance due and electing to sell the Property at trustee's sale. 
8. On January 4, 1996, Knighton paid to Lotts' trustee the sum of $38,734.54 
to pay the entire balance of the note, plus interest, assessments and the down payment. 
9. On January 18, 1996, by letter from Lotts' attorney to Knighton's attorney, 
Lotts demanded an additional $6,081.35 from Knighton to pay interest accrued before the 
judgment and before the deed was delivered, additional assessments and attorney's fees 
incurred even though there was no default. 
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10. On January 22, 1996, Knighton paid to Lotts the additional $6,081.35 
demanded by Lotts. This amount was paid under protest to put an end to Lotts' claims for 
further interest, fees, etc. 
11. On January 23, 1996, Lotts caused a deed of reconveyance to be delivered 
to Knighton, which was recorded January 24, 1996, thereby releasing any security interest 
in the Property. 
12. The agreement between the parties has, therefore, been fully performed 
by both parties, Lotts have received all amounts due them and more and Knighton has title 
to and possession of the Property. 
DATED this /£_ day of February, 1996. 
RALPH J. MARSH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
RALPH J. MARSH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: That 
he is individual who signed the foregoing affidavit; that he has read said affidavit and knows 
and understands the contents thereof; that the same is true of his knowledge, except as to 
matters therein stated on information and belief and as to these matters he believes it to be 
true. 
RALPH J. MARSH 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J ^ _ day of February, 1996, 
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tly Commiccbn Expires • 
October 27. 1C07 | 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the / » day of February, 1996, I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL 
FOR MOOTNESS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment having been set for hearing before 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on the 22nd day of June, 1995, 
at 8:00 a.m., Ralph J. Marsh of Backman, Clark & Marsh appearing 
for defendants and Mark A. Larsen of Campbell Maack & Sessions 
appearing for plaintiffs, and the Court having heard and 
considered the arguments of the parties and having examined and 
considered the affidavits and memoranda submitted by the parties 
and having determined that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and that defendants are entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law, and, specifically, the Court having determined 
the following facts to be undisputed: 
1. Plaintiffs, as seller, and defendant Knighton, as 
buyer, signed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement in January and 
February, 1994, providing for the sale of the property known as 
Lot 113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase II, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and providing that plaintiffs, as Seller, were 
to provide a preliminary title report to Knighton five business 
days before the closing and to designate a place for closing. 
2. On April 26, 1994, plaintiffs, through Knighton, 
either requested or gave their permission for Mr. Marsh to 
obtain a preliminary title report and prepare the closing 
3. KnightonJ delivered an executed promissory note and rt 
Trust Deed to Marsh on April 29, 1994. 
4. Mr. Charles Hammond, plaintiffs' expert witness, is 
not qualified to interpret the law nor the contract between 
these parties. 
5. Time was not the essence of the agreement between 
these parties until after fifteen days following the May 1, 
1994, closing date. 
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6. The survey required by the agreement was solely for 
the benefit of Knighton, although the survey was never 
performed• 
7. Plaintiffs, as seller, did not ever tender their 
performance of the agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED 
as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
2. Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against 
plaintiffs ordering plaintiffs to specifically perform the 
agreement between the parties by signing and returning to 
defendants the warranty deed conveying to defendant Knighton the 
property known as Lot 113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase II, legally 
described as follows: 
Beginning South 870.83 feet and East 2499.13 
feet from the West Quarter Corner of Section 21, 
Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence North 71°22f15" 
West 582.27 feet; thence North 18°37f45" East 
353.01 feet; thence Easterly along a curve to 
the right 704 feet; thence South 53°48f29" East 
304.13 feet; thence South 36°11?31" West 649.01 
feet to the point of beginning, containing 
10.48 acres. 
Marsh shall record the warranty deed and shall record the Trust 
Deed from Knighton to plaintiffs securing the promissory note 
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signed by Knighton to plaintiffs and delivering that promissory 
note to plaintiffs. 
4. Before the Warranty Deed is recorded, Defendant 
Knighton shall pay to plaintiffs the amount of the water 
assessment and all other assessments incurred after May 1, 1994, 
and paid by plaintiffs upon submission to Knighton of a copy of 
the assessment and evidence that it has been paid by plaintiffs. 
5. If the foregoing acts have not been performed by the 
parties within thirty days from the signing and entry of this 
judgment, the Court will enter an order vesting title to the 
property as specified herein pursuant to U.R.C.P. 70. 
6. Defendants are hereby awarded their reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter in the sum of 
DATED: Jtrjji^" /^T~1995. 
HOMER F. WILKINSON, Judge 
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TABX 
RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS A. LOTT and 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants-Appellees. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
APPEAL FOR MOOTNESS AND 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Case No. 950760-CA 
REPLY TO APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Not disputed. 
2. Not disputed. 
3. The closing did not take place on May 1, 1994, because the Lotts did not 
obtain a title report nor designate a place for closing as the agreement required them to do. 
Therefore, on instruction or with permission of the Lotts, Knighton's attorney prepared 
closing papers on April 29, 1994, had Knighton sign his side and sent the papers to be signed 
by Lotts to them. All delays from then on were the result of requests by Lotts for changes 
in the documents. 
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4. While Knighton signed a note providing for payments to begin June 1, 1994, 
that was in compliance with the agreement providing that monthly payments would 
commence one month following closing. Therefore, under the agreement, Knighton was not 
obligated to commence payments until one month following the delivery of the deed by Lotts 
in September, 1995. Lotts' claim that payments under the note were not contingent upon 
delivery of the warranty deed by Lotts is disingenuous because the note was not to be 
delivered until delivery of the deed. When the deed was finally delivered pursuant to the 
order of the district court, the note should have been rewritten to provide that payments 
commence one month later. Instead, Knighton tendered all payments due under the note 
as it stood, that is, payments due from June 1, 1994, through September 1, 1995. These 
payments were rejected by Lotts. 
5. Not disputed. 
6. Not disputed that suit was brought but the claims alleged in that suit were 
and are disputed and were rejected by the district court. 
7. Not disputed. 
8. Not disputed. 
9. Not disputed except that the date of filing was September 15, 1995. 
10. Not disputed. 
11. All assessments ordered to be paid by the district court were tendered to 
Lotts before the deed was recorded. The tender included all payments which were due 
under the note from June 1, 1994, through September 1, 1995, as well as the down payment. 
The tender, however, was rejected by Lotts. 
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12. In the tender to the Lotts on September 19, 1995, the attorney's fees 
awarded by the district court were offset because no supersedeas bond had been filed. [A 
cost bond had been filed and under Rule 6, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, no cost 
bond is required if a supersedeas bond is filed. It was reasonable to assume that no 
supersedeas bond would be filed.] On receiving the check with the offset for attorney's fees 
awarded, the Lotts thereafter filed a supersedeas bond for the amount of the fees awarded 
in a belated attempt to render the previous tender inadequate. 
13. Having already tendered all payments due under the note through 
September 1, 1995, Knighton sent the October 1, 1995 installment of $461.48 to the Lotts 
on October 10, 1995. The Lotts did not return this check nor give any notice to Knighton 
that it was not being accepted. 
14. Not disputed. 
15. Not disputed. 
16. Not disputed. 
17. Not disputed. 
18. In a letter to Knighton's attorney from Mark A. Larsen, Lotts' attorney, 
dated January 18, 1996, he requested him to "advise me immediately on whether the Lotts 
should cash the checks you have tendered with your agreement in writing that it will not 
prejudice their position to claim the remaining $6,081.35 due from Mr. Knighton as principal 
under the Promissory Note." [See copy of letter attached hereto]. In response, Mr. Marsh 
stated in a letter of January 22, 1996, that "your clients may deposit the prior checks 
tendered to them and to Mr. Andreasen without prejudice to their right to claim the 
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remaining $6,081.35 which is submitted herewith." [See copy of letter attached hereto]. 
There was no agreement that this was without prejudice to their rights, except as stated. 
19. Not disputed. 
20. Not disputed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BENEFITS DOCTRINE DOES 
APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. A NOTICE OF LIS 
PENDENS DOES NOT TAKE THE PLACE OF A 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND OR STAY. 
Lotts begin their argument by claiming the "twin necessities of complying with 
the trial court's Order to convey the Warranty Deed . . . as well as taking actions to protect 
their rights under the Promissory Note" and accusing Knighton of "stratagems" and "clever 
manipulation" in taking advantage of these "necessities." Neither of these was a necessity. 
As Black v. Alpha Financial Corp.. 656 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1982), stated:" At the time the 
judgment below was entered, the buyer, without complying with the judgment, could have 
brought an appeal to this Court after posting any necessary supersedeas bond. Had that 
been done, the controversy between the parties would still be alive on appeal." Therefore, 
it was not a necessity to delivery the warranty deed. Lotts deliberately chose to deliver the 
deed rather than post a supersedeas bond and obtain a stay of the judgment. Secondly, 
there was no necessity to take action to protect their rights under the note. All payments 
due under the note were tendered to Lotts (even though the note should have been 
rewritten to provide that payments begin one month after delivery of the deed). There was 
no default under the note and Lotts' rejection of the tender and immediate filing of a Notice 
of Default was itself a stratagem and clever manipulation to force Knighton into the 
dilemma of having to go back into court to obtain a stay of the foreclosure proceedings or 
pay the unjustified demands of the Lotts. The default was declared by Lotts! How can they 
complain if Knighton pays what they demand? If that results in a loss of their right to 
appeal, the fault is entirely theirs. 
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Moreover, it is not Knighton's payment of the funds demanded by Lotts which 
renders this appeal moot, although their acceptance of those funds and reconveyance of the 
trust deed certainly adds weight to the argument. It is Lotts' failure to post a supersedeas 
bond to stay the judgment and their voluntary delivery of the deed in compliance with the 
judgment which constitute the acceptance of the benefits of the judgment and render the 
appeal moot. To argue that "the only 'benefits' the Lotts received derived from their filing 
of a Notice of Default under the Promissory Note," as Lotts do, is to ignore the fact that the 
Promissory Note would not have been delivered to them unless and until the warranty deed 
was delivered and recorded. Their rights under the note and trust deed arose solely from 
the delivery of the deed. Obviously, they had no right to payment for the purchase of the 
property until the sale of the property had been closed by delivery of the deed. 
The claim that the Court still has before it the controversies regarding 
construction of the Earnest Money and Sales Agreement (a controversy on which Lotts' 
argument is wrong on its face) is the same argument that was raised and rejected in Trees 
v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987), Black v. Alpha Financial Corp., 656 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1982), Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1990), and all of the 
other cases which have established the acceptance of the benefits doctrine. In one of those 
cases, relied upon in Trees v. Lewis, the defendant, against whom the judgment was 
awarded, wrote to the plaintiffs attorney explaining that he did not intend to waive his right 
to appeal by moving off the land. The Supreme Court nevertheless held that he had 
acquiesced in the judgment and waived his right to appeal. Ottenheimer v. Mountain State 
Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 Pac. 1117, 1118 (Utah 1920). One cannot preserve his right 
to appeal by his intent to preserve it. His actions speak louder than his words or his 
intentions. It is the acceptance of the benefits of the judgment or the acquiescence in the 
judgment which renders the appeal moot. Lotts' own conclusion, page 2 of their 
memorandum, that their "appellate remedies were pre-empted and mooted by the Lotts' 
compliance with the trial court's Order" is an exact statement of the law. They had total 
control over their appeal but chose to close the transaction and demand payment from 
Knighton rather than to await the outcome of their own appeal. 
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The Lotts' contention that the filing of a lis pendens gives constructive notice 
of the pendency of proceedings and those dealing with the property take subject to the 
outcome of the proceedings is not disputed. However, the lis pendens does not preserve this 
Court's jurisdiction. It only gives notice to others of the pendency of the case. This Court's 
jurisdiction is determined by other factors, including the mootness of the appeal. 
Furthermore, to argue that the filing of a lis pendens takes the place of a 
supersedeas bond is to ignore the purpose of a supersedeas and to accept such an argument 
would render the requirement of a supersedeas bond superfluous. The filing of a lis 
pendens makes it impossible for Knighton to sell the property or build on the property or 
to borrow money against it. Therefore, he is deprived of many of the basic rights of an 
owner of the property. The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to protect Knighton against 
any losses he may sustain, as a result of his inability to use the property in any way he sees 
fit, in the event the appeal is dismissed or the judgment affirmed. The lis pendens protects 
only the Lotts. A supersedeas bond is intended to protect Knighton. One does not take the 
place of the other. 
The offer to now post a supersedeas bond in the amount Knighton paid to the 
Lotts is another belated attempt by Lotts to avoid the inevitable results of their original 
failure to file a supersedeas bond. Once they have accepted the benefits of or acquiesced 
in the judgment, the law dictates the dismissal of their appeal as moot. It is now too late 
to comply with the law applicable to them at the time. Furthermore, a bond in the amount 
Knighton paid them would not be sufficient to cover his damages. Because of the filing of 
the lis pendens, Knighton was required to pay six points instead of one or two points to 
obtain a loan to pay off the Lotts and was required to pay 15 3/4 % interest instead of 7 or 
8 percent that would have been available from a standard lender. In addition, he has 
incurred further attorney's fees which a supersedeas bond should cover and he has been 
unable to resell the property, which may have cost him many thousands of dollars in lost 
profits. A deposit of the amount the Lotts have received from Knighton would not begin 
to cover Knighton's possible losses and damages in this matter. Furthermore, that offer is 
nothing more than a request for Knighton, the successful party below, to post the 
supersedeas bond for the Lotts since the money they are now offering to post is money that 
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Knighton paid to them. Therefore, they would only be posting Knighton's money as a 
supersedeas. That is not what the rules contemplate. 
Lotts further argue that the district court's order in this case was self-executing 
in the same since as a dismissal of the case would have been and, therefore, a supersedeas 
bond is unnecessary. That position is ludicrous. The district court did not dismiss this case 
but rendered judgment in favor of Knighton. That judgment was not self-executing because 
it required that either the Lotts deliver the deed or, upon their failure to deliver, Knighton 
to apply to the Court for an order under Rule 70, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to transfer 
title to Knighton. Either requirement would have been stayed by the filing of a supersedeas 
bond and could not have been stayed without the filing of a supersedeas bond. 
Lotts' claim that they took all the affirmative steps to preserve their appeal is 
simply not true. They filed a Notice of Appeal and a Cost Bond on Appeal and they filed 
a supersedeas to cover the attorney's fees only after payment of all amounts due them, less 
those attorney's fees, had been tendered to and rejected by them. They failed to apply for 
a stay of execution of the judgment and failed to file a supersedeas bond required to pay 
Knighton's damages in the event of dismissal of the appeal or affirmance of the judgment. 
Those are the critical missing steps. Instead, they acquiesced in the judgment by delivering 
the warranty deed and demanding payment of all amounts due them in return for that deed. 
Their statement, on page 8 of their memorandum, that "Knighton's motion, taken to its 
logical extreme, asks this Court to dismiss the Lott's appeal because they complied with the 
trial court's Order," is again an exact statement of the law applicable to this case. 
Compliance with the trial court's order is acquiescence in the judgment. Only a stay and 
supersedeas bond would change that result. In this case, they not only complied with the 
court's order, they then demanded payment from Knighton of the full amount of the note, 
even though it was not due, including attorney's fees incurred in declaring a default when 
there was no default. Their "stratagem," to extract more money from Knighton than was 
due, succeeded when Knighton complied. He complied only to avoid further claims by Lotts 
for additional amounts. Lotts have chosen their own course of action. The law applicable 
to that course of action requires a dismissal of their appeal. 
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POINT II 
THE MERGER DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS 
CASE. KNIGHTON IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF THE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES HE HAS INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL 
UNDER THE CONTRACT SUBJECT TO THIS APPEAL AND 
UNDER RULE 33. 
The Lotts' argument that the merger doctrine applies to prevent the awarding 
of fees to Knighton on this appeal appears to have been made without realizing that it is 
inconsistent with their argument in Point I. Knighton has argued, based on well-established 
law, that delivery of the deed in compliance with the judgment renders the appeal moot. 
Lotts disagree yet argue that delivery of the deed renders a claim for attorney's fees moot. 
However, this appeal does not involve any issue between the parties that would arise after 
closing of the transaction (where the merger doctrine would properly apply). It does involve 
a claim by the Lotts that the district court has improperly interpreted the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement. That agreement includes a provision for fees to be paid by the defaulting 
party, which the district court ordered. This case is not factually different from Trees v. 
Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 614 (Utah 1987), in which conveyance of property was ordered and 
complied with and the prevailing party was awarded attorney's fees both in the lower court 
and on appeal. When an award of fees is appropriate in the district court, it is also 
appropriate on appeal. Willev v. Willey. 866 P.2d 547, 556 (Utah App. 1993). 
Furthermore, an award of fees on appeal would be appropriate under Rule 33, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides for an award of fees in case of a 
frivolous appeal or appeal for delay. An appeal filed when the appellant has acquiesced in 
the judgment and rendered any appeal moot is frivolous. Existing law does not warrant an 
appeal in such a case. Lack of good faith is not required to justify the awarding of fees 
under this Rule. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1987). 
DATED t h i s / X day of March, 1996. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh j 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the /<? day of March, 1996, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL 
FOR MOOTNESS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
ROBERT O. MAACK 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
E. BARNEY GESAS 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
MARTIN R. OENNEY 
TRACY H. FOWLER 
MARK A. LARSEN 
PERRIN R. LOVE 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
WILLIAM H. CHRISTENSEN 
JAY W. BUTLER 
JOANN SHIELDS 
ELIZABETH KING 
C. PARKINSON LLOYO 
KRISTINE EDDE 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
ONE UTAH CENTER 
T H I R T E E N T H FLOOR 
2 0 I SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8-4 I I I -22 I5 
January 18, 1996 
TELEPHONE 
(801) 5 3 7 - 5 5 5 5 
FACSIMILE 
(801) 5 3 7 - 5 1 9 9 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
Backman, Clark & Marsh 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Lott Foreclosure Against Knighton 
Balance Due on Trust Deed Note 
HAND DELIVERED 
Dear Ralph: 
Thank you for your letter to Dean C. Andreasen dated 
January 4, 1996, which has been referred to me for response. I 
wanted to provide you with the pay-off and attorneys' fees and 
costs necessary to eliminate the Trust Deed foreclosure. 1 have 
broken the accounting down as follows: (1) interest on the 
Promissory Note; (2) an itemization of monies owed for each 
assessment the Lotts have paid despite your clientf s contractual 
obligation to do so, also with interest assessed at the legal rate; 
(3) the Earnest Money Deposit and Down Payment, together with 
interest at the legal rate; (4) attorneys' fees and costs to date. 
1. Payments on the Promissory Note. 
The first payment on the Note was due June 1, 1994, according 
to the terms of the Note. The Note establishes interest at the 
rate of nine percent per annum. The only attempted payment made on 
the Note was made on October 18, 1995, which the Lotts did not cash 
because it was late and the foreclosure process had begun. If you 
want them to cash that check, without prejudice to their position, 
please advise. 
Beginning May 1, 1994, and through January 4, 1996, interest 
on the $31,500 principal on the Note amounts to $4,725.00 for a 
total of $36,225.00. Your calculation is $3,855.08 short. 
;AMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq, 
January 18, 1996 
Page 2 
2. Unpaid Assessments. 
The assessments listed below were paid by the Lotts despite 
the contractual obligation of Knighton to assume these payments, 






















You are incorrect in your letter dated September 22, 1995, where 
you suggest that these assessments are not properly prorated 
against Mr. Knighton. The two $150.00 assessments are general 
assessments and the $420.00 is the annual road assessment. 
Together they total of $720.00 and all run from August 1, 1993, to 
July 31, 1994. The $180.00 is the prorated portion of those 
amounts for May, June and July of 1994. 
3. Earnest Money Deposit and Down Payment. 
In addition, Mr. & Mrs. Lott are entitled to the Earnest Money 
Deposit and Down Payment totaling $3,195.00 set forth in the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated January 27, 1994, which we 
understand was deposited in your Trust Account. After the Lotts 
delivered the Warranty Deed to you, and you chose to ignore the 
escrow instructions, there was no reason for you to hold that 
amount. Interest at the legal rate of ten percent per annum from 
September 14, 1995, to January 4, 1996, amounts to $97.16. The 
principal and interest for the Earnest Money Deposit and Down 
Payment totals $3,292.16. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
January 18, 1996 
Page 3 
4. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
The Note requires the payment of our attorneys f fees and costs 
incurred in this matter. Enclosed are the redacted bills for 
attorneys' fees and costs to the Lotts for the foreclosure 
proceeding. These billing statements dated November 8, 1995, and 
December 13, 1995, total $1,480.75. The Lotts have paid that 
amount. In addition, I have spent an additional hour responding to 
your January 4, 1996, letter at $140.00 per hour. The total 
attorneys' fees and costs, therefore, amounts to $1,620.75. In 
addition, there may be additional time in December of 1995, but 
those records are not available until next week. In the event 
additional attorneys' fees are due, I will bring this to your 
attention next week. 
5. Total Amounts Due. 
The following is a summary of the amounts due the Lotts: 
Description Amount 
Promissory Note $36,225.00 
Unpaid Assessments 4,139.46 
Earnest Money Deposit & Down Payment 3,292.16 
Attorneys' Fees 1,620.75 
Total $45,277.37 
The total amount your client owes the Lotts is $45,277.37. 
Your letter dated January 4, 1996, enclosed a check in the amount 
of $38,734.54. On the first page of your letter you state this is 
"payment in full." On the second page, you state, "If more is due 
to pay off the obligation, it will be immediately forwarded to 
you." Please advise whether you want the Lotts to cash the 
$38,734.54 check enclosed with your letter, as well as the 
October 18, 1995, check in the sum of $461.48. They will only do 
so if you agree that it does not prejudice their position to claim 
the remaining $6,081.35 due from Mr. Knighton. Also, they will 
apply the checks to the payments first to the Earnest Money Deposit 
& Down Payment, then to the unpaid assessments, then to the payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs, then to the payment of interest on 
the Promissory Note and finally to the payment of principal on the 
Promissory Note. 
;AMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
January 18, 1996 
Page 4 
Please advise me immediately on whether the Lotts should cash 
the checks you have tendered with your agreement in writing that it 
will not prejudice their position to claim the remaining $6,081.35 
due from Mr. Knighton as principal under the Promissory Note. 
Very truly yours, 





cc: Dennis & Francine Lott 
Dean C. Andreasen 
wp51\mal\lott\marsh.jl8.011896 
BACKMAN, CLARK & M A R S H 
RALPH | . MARSH ATTORNEYS AT LAW T I ^ P > H c ° ^ E 0 m « 
„ _ ( o v ) l ) J J I - O O U U 
GARY A. SARGENT FAX NUMRFR 
DAVID R. BOYOE 8 0 0 MCINTTRE BUILDING (801) 363-2420 
6 8 SOUTH MAIN 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 0 1 
January 22, 1996 
MR. MARK A. LARSEN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
Attorneys at Law 
One Utah Center 
Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Re: Lott v. Knighton 
Dear Mark: 
Enclosed is our check in the amount of $6,081.35 demanded in your letter of 
January 18, 1996. Your clients may deposit the prior checks tendered to them and to 
Mr. Andreasen without prejudice to their right to claim the remaining $6,081.35 which 
is submitted herewith. 
Nevertheless, this additional amount is being paid under protest. You have no 
right to claim that any payments were due under the note until the sale was closed by 
the delivery of a deed by your clients. That did not happen until September 14, 1995, 
after the court ordered its delivery. Furthermore, even though we tendered all 
installments as if the transaction had closed on May 1, 1994, not even the first 
installment was due until one month after the delivery of the deed. And certainly, no 
interest would be due on those installments prior to that time. Therefore, your demand 
for $3,855.08 additional interest is out of order. 
The same response applies to your claim that assessments should have been paid 
by Knighton before he received a deed from the Lotts. He had no such obligation. He 
should not be chargeable with any assessments due before delivery of the deed with the 
exception of the water assessment which he specifically agreed to pay. You, therefore, 
have no right to demand payment of the annual assessments other than a prorata 
portion of the 1995 assessment. Interest would not be due on that amount until 
MR. MARK A. LARSEN 
January 22, 1996 
Page 2 
delivery of the deed. Contrary to your statement that Knighton had partial 
responsibility for the 6/15/93 road assessment, you admitted in your letter of September 
20, 1995, that "the amount of $420.00 plus interest is not chargeable to Mr. Knighton." 
Your demand for an additional $508.36 for assessments plus interest is also out of 
order. 
The down payment was tendered to you on September 19, 1995, and you, 
therefore, have no right to demand interest on that amount. In fact, more than the 
$3,195.00 was tendered to you at that time. 
I find your demand for attorney's fees to be incredible. In the first place, there 
was no default on which you could base a claim for attorney's fees. In the second place, 
a demand for $1,620.75 for preparing, recording and mailing a Substitution of Trustee 
and Notice of Default is totally unreasonable. No other work was required during the 
reinstatement period. You and your firm are either the most expensive (which is 
probably true anyway) or the most inefficient firm in the State. In the third place, your 
attached statement for attorney's fees has conveniently redacted the information which 
would disclose the relevance of the time spent to your foreclosure proceeding. The 
statement certainly does not explain or justify the fees charged. 
Despite our objections to your demands, we are paying the full amount of your 
demand in order to put an end to your claims for further interest, fees or other 
amounts. Please forward a Deed of Reconveyance immediately. 
Yours truly, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
RJM/rm 
cc: Kerry L. Knighton 
Ralph J. Maifih 
